原创 2016-04-06 季天鹤央行观察

作者：季天鹤，央行观察专栏作家

纵观20年来的金融操作，我们又看到了一个新操作横空出世，也就是股票还债。中国市场似乎总在资产侧面临问题，因此很多宏观层面的金融操作都围绕着负债和所有者权益进行。十年后的人们，会像现在看1998年和2007年一样，对2015年的金融操作感到惊叹。

最近外汇局旗下公司成为众多A股公司股东一事引发了市场热烈的关注，有媒体迅速指出外汇局的增持和证金的减持步调一致，也有分析又一次开始喟叹二次结汇带来的无奈。市场是健忘的，对于去年那个躁动夏天里的救市大戏，以及外汇局投资境内的各种问题，或许又到了需要重新梳理的时候。

二次结汇是个伪问题

去年的这个时候，我在《央行观察》发表了4篇文章讨论二次结汇问题。第一篇《外汇储备不是税，那是啥？》指出结汇确实和财政税收不同，但和财政发债一致，二次结汇中包含的“存入外汇”操作，如同财政发债使自身资产负债同时变大一样，使央行资产负债同时变大。第二篇《划拨外汇储备能否崩坏央行资产负债表？》指出由于外汇储备美元值藏在外汇占款后面，只要划拨外汇储备对外汇占款无影响，就不会导致央行资产负债表因划拨出现亏损。

第三篇《二次结汇的危害到底有多大？》和第四篇《外汇储备注资国开行会造成哪些货币影响？》进一步指出，由于外汇没有编号也不能追踪路径，央行其实无法追踪找它结汇的外汇持有者所持有的外汇，是不是过去某个时候央行投出去的外汇。二次结汇因此乃是个伪问题，因为谁也无法区分某次结汇是一次结汇还是二次结汇。

最终结论是，二次结汇的问题不在于结汇，而是在于其他的操作导致的外汇资产与人民币资产不对应。无偿划拨外汇储备的问题，不在于二次结汇，而在于划拨本身导致外汇的规模和央行负债规模的比例变化。而注资国开行的问题也不在于二次结汇，而在于注资这一操作使得外汇储备减少，同样导致外汇的规模与央行负债规模的比例变化。最后的结果都是央行应对购汇维护汇率稳定的能力变差。

我们完全可以想象另一个例子：央行直接创造人民币准备金并用于注资国开行以及其他境内银行，资产侧增加了股权投资，负债侧增加了人民币准备金存款，而国开行和其他境内银行的资产与所有者权益也同时扩张。整个操作完全和外汇无关，但我们一眼就能看出，外汇储备和人民币准备金存款的比例变化了，因为前者不变而后者变大了。

上述操作对于市场参与者而言，恐怕要比外汇储备入股银行要好理解得多。具体的过程有很多可能，取决于银行如何持有外汇，央行通过怎样的方式注入外汇等等。对上述问题比较全面的讨论，可以参考我的《汇金与中投：精彩的注资大戏》和《人民币汇率分析的基本问题-外汇、外汇存款、外汇储备》两篇文章。汇金和中投的诞生极为复杂，但也因此极为精彩。

央行直接印钞并持有股权，虽避免了二次结汇这个伪问题在市场上造成的理解混乱，但这个操作恐怕又太大胆、太挑战人们的神经。不过，从中国央行看来，持有股权早就不是第一次，07年以前央行旗下的汇金持有的股权规模更为庞大。在中国从来没有央行不能持股的“禁忌”，这次出现在A股市场恐怕也算不上“打破禁忌”。

这次不一样：二级市场当股东不是注资

但国开行与交行的两个案例其实有一个巨大的差别：央行注资国开行乃是在一级市场注资，国开行的资产负债会同时变大。但央行持有交行的股票是在二级市场，交行本身并没有收到一分钱，自己的所有者权益也没有变大，只是股东换了。结合前面提到的证金减持，以及12月央行资产负债的数据，我们能够很容易看到事实上发生了什么。

我们知道，15年7月份央行对其他金融性公司债权增加了2000亿，而增加的原因基本上就是为了救市而提供流动性，而接受央行流动性的这家其他金融性公司恐怕就是证金。而15年12月，央行对其他金融性公司债权减少3000亿，当月其他资产增加1940亿，这恐怕就是反映了媒体报道的证金减持与外汇局增持。

上述的数据告诉我们，证金把自己持有的一系列股票交给央行用来还债，而这部分股票被央行通过储备持有。证金的资产和负债都少了，而央行的债权资产少了，股权资产增加了。整个操作乃是债权和股票的交易，而不涉及央行负债层面的银行间流动性，不涉及广义货币层面的实体经济流动性，不涉及央行资产侧的外汇流动性。说央行持有交行股票是创造了流动性，可谓差矣。

如果说现在人们指责央行印钞进入股市，那么人们首先要面对的问题就是，央行持有这些股票的根源，乃是7月份的救市，以及在那个月央行创造的2000亿流动性。人们不应该既要央行印钞救市，又不要央行印钞进入股市。要么没有前者，要么没有后者。一方面要求央行出手，一方面看到央行成了股东之后又开始抱怨，这种态度恐怕值得推敲。所以说，对央行在A股市场出现，请多一分前后一致。

更需要思考的是，为什么证金公司不采取一种更坦率的办法，卖股票还债呢？这样的话，央行救市创造出来的流动性就被证金公司的还款行为给消除了。这是不是就符合人们的期待了呢？恐怕不会，人们肯定又要抱怨证金的减持对股市不利了。事实上证金如果减持股票并还债，将在广义货币流动性和银行间流动性两个层面消除流动性，也同时让自己、银行和央行缩表，一个操作降了三个杠杆，多么好，但要不要尝试一下呢，敢不敢呢？

在用股票还债当中，证金公司其实占了很大的便宜，而央行其实是吃了大亏。如果央行为自己考虑，就应该要求证金公司用现金来还债，因为当时救市时央行借给证金的就是现金，以钱还钱本是正常。证金公司卖股票换钱，肯定把股票价格都砸得巨低，而央行这个时候拿着证金还回来的钱出手救市，用2000亿换来的银行股份绝对不止现在这样少。

之所以最后达成了股票还债的交易，已经是考虑了金融稳定和广大股民利益的结果。除了央行的外储接受了股票，财政部的汇金也接受了股票，其实都很不容易。没有接受到股票的大概就是证券公司了，可我们看到他们就只能呼吁证金公司赶快还钱，其实也还拿不到钱。为了金融体系的稳定，大家都做出了很多让步。

而纵观20年来的金融操作，我们又看到了一个新操作横空出世，也就是股票还债。中国市场似乎总在资产侧面临问题，因此很多宏观层面的金融操作都围绕着负债和所有者权益进行。1998年国家财政发国债入股四大行，2007年国家财政发国债买汇金，都是扩表用债入股（一级市场）或买股（二级市场），而现在我们看到了反过来的股票还债缩表的操作。十年后的人们，会像现在看1998年和2007年一样，对2015年的金融操作感到惊叹。

Looking back over the financial operations of the past 20 years, we have witnessed the emergence of a new operation – stock-for-debt exchange. It seems that the Chinese market is always facing issues on the asset side, which is why many macro-level financial operations revolve around debt and owner's equity. People a decade from now will probably marvel at the financial operations of 2015, much like we do today when looking at the events of 1998 and 2007.

The recent news about companies under the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) becoming shareholders of numerous A-share companies has attracted significant attention from the market. Some media quickly pointed out the alignment between SAFE's increased holdings and China Investment Corporation's (CIC) decreased holdings. This has led to renewed discussions about the repercussions of the second round of foreign exchange conversion.

The market has a tendency to forget. The dramatic market intervention from last year's restless summer and the various issues related to SAFE's domestic investments may be due for a reevaluation.

The Second Round of Foreign Exchange Conversion is a False Issue

Around this time last year, I published four articles discussing the second round of foreign exchange conversion in my column 'Central Bank Observations'. The first article, 'Foreign Reserves Are Not Tax, What Are They?', pointed out that while foreign exchange conversion is indeed different from fiscal taxation, it is similar to fiscal issuance of debt. Just as fiscal issuance of debt increases both assets and liabilities, the 'depositing of foreign exchange' operation in the second round of conversion causes both the central bank's assets and liabilities to increase simultaneously.

The second article, 'Can Transferring Foreign Reserves Wreck the Central Bank's Balance Sheet?', explained that since the value of the foreign exchange reserves in USD is hidden behind foreign exchange deposits, as long as transferring foreign reserves doesn't affect foreign exchange deposits, it wouldn't lead to losses on the central bank's balance sheet due to the transfer.

The third and fourth articles, 'How Harmful Is the Second Round of Foreign Exchange Conversion?' and 'What Currency Effects Can Foreign Reserve Capitalization of China Development Bank Cause?', further pointed out that since foreign exchange lacks individual tracking and traceability, the central bank cannot trace the foreign exchange holdings of those who conducted the second round of conversion to determine whether it's foreign exchange they invested in the central bank's foreign exchange pool at some point in the past. Hence, the issue of the second round of conversion is a false one, as no one can differentiate between a first-time conversion and a second-time conversion.

The ultimate conclusion is that the issue with the second round of conversion is not the conversion itself but rather the mismatches caused by other operations between foreign exchange assets and RMB assets. The problem of gratuitously transferring foreign exchange reserves lies not in the second round of conversion but in the change in the proportion of the scale of foreign exchange and the central bank's liability scale resulting from the transfer. Similarly, the issue with capitalizing China Development Bank does not lie in the second round of conversion, but in the fact that the capitalization operation leads to a reduction in foreign exchange reserves, thus altering the proportion of the scale of foreign exchange and the central bank's liability.

The end result of both scenarios is a reduced ability of the central bank to conduct foreign exchange purchases to maintain exchange rate stability.

We can easily imagine another example: the central bank directly creating RMB reserves and using them to capitalize China Development Bank and other domestic banks, increasing equity investment on the asset side and increasing RMB reserve deposits on the liability side. This expansion would also simultaneously increase the assets and owner's equity of China Development Bank and other domestic banks. This entire operation has nothing to do with foreign exchange, but we can instantly see that the proportion between foreign exchange reserves and RMB reserve deposits has changed, because the former remains unchanged while the latter has grown.

For market participants, the above scenario of capitalizing banks through stock holdings might be much easier to understand than the central bank converting foreign reserves and entering the stock market. The specific process could vary widely depending on how banks hold foreign exchange and how the central bank injects foreign exchange. A comprehensive discussion of these issues can be found in my articles 'The Fascinating Capitalization Drama of China Investment Corporation and Central Huijin' and 'Fundamental Issues in RMB Exchange Rate Analysis – Foreign Exchange, RMB Reserve Deposits, and Foreign Reserves'. The birth of China Investment Corporation and Central Huijin was extremely complex but also fascinating.

Directly printing money and holding equity might avoid the confusion in the market caused by the false issue of the second round of conversion, but this operation might be too bold and challenging for people. However, from the perspective of the People's Bank of China, holding equity is not new; before 2007, Central Huijin held much larger equity positions. There's never been a 'taboo' against central banks holding stocks in China, so the appearance of the central bank in the A-share market might not be considered 'breaking a taboo'.

This Time Is Different: Being a Shareholder in the Secondary Market Is Not Capitalization

However, there is a crucial difference between the cases of China Development Bank and Bank of Communications: the central bank's capitalization of China Development Bank was carried out in the primary market, expanding the assets and liabilities of the bank simultaneously. On the other hand, the central bank's acquisition of shares in Bank of Communications happened in the secondary market, and the bank itself didn't receive any money; its owner's equity didn't increase – only the shareholders changed. When combined with the previously mentioned reduction in China Investment Corporation's holdings and the central bank's asset-liability data from December, it's quite clear what actually happened.

We know that in July of the same year, the central bank increased the debt of other financial companies by 200 billion yuan. The main reason for this increase was to provide liquidity for the market intervention, and it's highly likely that the financial company receiving the liquidity injection was China Investment Corporation. In December of the same year, the central bank reduced the debt of other financial companies by 300 billion yuan. During that month, other assets increased by 194 billion yuan, which probably reflects the media-reported decrease in China Investment Corporation's holdings and the increase in foreign exchange reserves under SAFE.

The above data tells us that China Investment Corporation handed over a series of stocks to the central bank to repay debt, and these stocks were then held by the central bank through its reserves. China Investment Corporation's assets and liabilities decreased, and the central bank's debt assets decreased while equity assets increased. This entire operation was essentially a transaction involving debt and stocks – it didn't involve interbank liquidity at the debt level, real economy liquidity at the broad money level, or foreign exchange liquidity at the central bank's asset level. Thus, claiming that the central bank holding Bank of Communications shares created liquidity is quite a stretch.

If people are now accusing the central bank of printing money to enter the stock market, then the first issue they need to address is the source of the shares the central bank holds – namely, the liquidity created in July to stabilize the market, along with the 200 billion yuan in liquidity injected by the central bank that month. People cannot both demand that the central bank prints money to stabilize the market and then complain when the central bank enters the stock market. It's either one or the other. When urging the central bank to take action, but then criticizing the central bank for becoming a shareholder, this kind of attitude deserves careful consideration. Therefore, when it comes to the central bank's presence in the A-share market, a consistent perspective is essential.

What's even more worth pondering is why China Investment Corporation didn't opt for a more straightforward approach – selling stocks to repay debt. This way, the liquidity created by the central bank's market intervention in July would have been removed by China Investment Corporation's repayment actions. Does this align with people's expectations? Probably not; people would likely still complain about China Investment Corporation's stock sell-off negatively affecting the stock market. In reality, if China Investment Corporation were to sell stocks to repay debt, it would eliminate liquidity at both the broad money and interbank levels. This action would also lead to deleveraging for China Investment Corporation, banks, and the central bank, a move that sounds beneficial. But should such an attempt be made, and is it feasible?

In the process of using stocks to repay debt, China Investment Corporation actually gained a significant advantage, while the central bank suffered substantial losses. If the central bank were to consider its own interests, it should have requested China Investment Corporation to repay the debt with cash. After all, during the market intervention, the central bank lent cash to China Investment Corporation, so repaying in kind would have been normal. If China Investment Corporation were to sell stocks to repay debt, it would undoubtedly suppress stock prices. At this point, the central bank stepping in to stabilize the market using the cash returned by China Investment Corporation would have led to a much larger stake in bank stocks than it currently has, obtained with the 200 billion yuan spent.

The ultimate agreement to use stocks to repay debt is the result of considering financial stability and the interests of a broad range of stockholders. Both the People's Bank of China accepting stocks as collateral and the Ministry of Finance's China Investment Corporation accepting stocks were not easy decisions. Securities companies are likely the only ones that haven't accepted stocks, but all they can do is urge China Investment Corporation to repay its debt quickly. In reality, they won't receive any money either. For the sake of financial system stability, everyone has made numerous concessions.

Looking back over the past 20 years of financial operations, we once again see the emergence of a new operation – stock-for-debt exchange. It seems that the Chinese market always faces issues on the asset side, which is why many macro-level financial operations revolve around debt and owner's equity. In 1998, the national finances issued bonds to become shareholders in the four largest banks; in 2007, they issued bonds to acquire China Investment Corporation. Both instances involved expanding the balance sheet through debt-to-equity conversion (in the primary market) or buying shares (in the secondary market). Now, we are witnessing an operation that goes in the opposite direction, using stocks to repay debt and contract the balance sheet. People a decade from now will probably marvel at the financial operations of 2015, much like we do today when looking at the events of 1998 and 2007.