原创 2016-03-20 季天鹤央行观察

资产负债表是活的，它体现了活生生的操作和交易的结果。单独的比大小看走势的意义是有限的。当我们研究一个指标的变化的时候，必须要考虑到它对于其他指标的影响。这是复式计帐法的要求，也体现了它的力量。每一项操作都涉及到一借一贷，有借必有贷、借贷必相等。同时，每一个交易都涉及到买方和卖方，必须同时考虑到交易对两方面的影响。

经济活动有两面，一面是实体，一面是货币。我们的衣食住行都是实体，货物和服务都是实体。但同时，我们的生活中又充满了货币/钱/资金等，我们会用钱去买东西，用钱炒股票，把钱借给别人。实体和货币共同组成了我们的经济活动，而关注经济活动的经济学家们，也从实体和货币两个角度来进行研究。

宏观经济学从亚当斯密以来，一直关注实体活动，他认为这才是国民的真正财富，这当然是千真万确的。但同时，货币一直存在于我们的经济活动当中，重商主义者那种对货币的关注也就不能被完全抛弃，对货币的分析也就不会停止。如果想要跟踪经济运行中货币的一面，我们就要涉及到央行发布的系列资产负债表——央行资产负债表，其他存款性公司资产负债表，以及存款性公司概览。

央行系列资产负债表简介

存款性公司包括货币当局（央行）和其他存款性公司。央行资产负债表，其他存款性公司资产负债表，以及存款性公司概览中，我们首先可以关注存款性公司概览，因为这里面有一个很重要的指标：货币和准货币。货币包括两个项目（流通中货币和单位活期存款），准货币包括三个项目（单位定期存款，个人存款，其他存款）。其中，流通中货币是央行发行的纸硬币，其他的都是银行存款，两者的发行人／负债人是不同的。

除了一个很重要的指标之外，还有一个很重要的等式：国外净资产＋国内信贷＝货币和准货币＋不纳入广义货币的存款＋债券＋实收资本＋其他（净）。这个等式告诉了我们，货币和准货币是怎样被创造出来的。国外净资产和国内信贷会创造M2，而不纳入广义货币的存款、债券、实收资本等都会造成M2的分流，比如原本在M2里面的存款变成不在M2的存款，或者用来购买银行债券/股权等。

央行资产负债表和其他存款性公司资产负债表共同构成了存款性公司概览，其他存款性公司资产负债表中包含了所有M2中的四种存款，所以我们也可以从其他存款性公司资产负债表当中来观察M2中最重要的部分的变化情况。比如说，银行发放房贷，购房者手上就有了更多的存款，M2增加；比如说银行发行债券给企业，企业存款减少，持有的银行债券增加，M2减少。

而央行资产负债表则表现了央行自己资产和负债的关系。央行和非银行机构和个人间的关系，比起银行来要少很多，主要通过纸硬币发行以及财政存款来体现。个人和企业在央行有存款帐户的恐怕非常少，但理论上并不是不可以。但是，央行的资产侧和非银行机构关系比较多，包括国外机构（外汇）、政府（债券）、非银行金融机构（四大AMC、证券公司等），其中国外资产比重最大。

最后强调一点：资产负债表是活的，它体现了活生生的操作和交易的结果。单独的比大小看走势的意义是有限的。当我们研究一个指标的变化的时候，必须要考虑到它对于其他指标的影响。这是复式计帐法的要求，也体现了它的力量。每一项操作都涉及到一借一贷，有借必有贷、借贷必相等。同时，每一个交易都涉及到买方和卖方，必须同时考虑到交易对两方面的影响。

央行系列资产负债表分析实例：外汇储备

外汇储备的形成是一系列操作的结果。这一结果体现在3.2万亿美元的外汇储备规模上，同时也体现在24.2万亿人民币的央行国外资产-外汇上，这个项目一般被称作央行外汇占款。如前面所述，我们要观察每一项操作的借贷影响，以及每一笔交易对于买方和卖方的影响。只有这样，才是完成了复式计帐法的要求，才能真正全面看清楚一个过程。

前面提到，央行只和银行发生关系，而央行不可能自己给自己创造出外汇资产（听说朝鲜有专门制造假人民币的机关，不知真假，但如果有的话，或许朝鲜央行可以自己给自己创造外汇储备），因此央行的外汇资产除了外汇储备经营收益之外，都是和银行进行互动的结果。由此我们也找到了互动的双方：银行手里的外汇减少，央行手里的外汇增加。同时，一个操作肯定涉及到借贷两方。银行手里的外汇不可能白白减少，要么对应了手里其他东西的增加，要么对应了自己负债的减少，要么对应了自己股权的减少。

在上述的外汇操作里面，我们看到银行和央行的关系并不是简单的一手交钱一手交货，而是一手拿货一手欠钱。央行增加了外汇资产，同时增加了对银行的债务，而银行增加了在央行的存款，并且减少了外汇资产。上述的交易不是一般的“钱货两讫”交易，而是“赊账交易”。之所以这样，乃是银行央行负债的特殊地位：央行负债中的纸硬币乃是法定货币，央行负债中的存款可以随时转化成纸硬币等法定货币。因此，央行才有这样的底气把自己的债务给银行并结束交易。从货币的角度看，这就是基础货币的发行。从交易的角度看，这是一种赊账交易。

而银行的外汇是哪里来的？当然不是中国的银行印制出来的美元假币，而是非银行机构通过贸易或者接受投资等方式得到外汇后存入银行的。虽然我们在银行的资产侧看不到很多外汇，因为银行把外汇给了央行，但是我们还是能从两个指标上看到外汇对银行体系的影响。一是银行资产侧巨大的在央行存款/储备货币，这是银行把外汇给央行后得到的对价。二是银行负债侧M2中，有一部分乃是非银行主体结汇产生的。

我们看到，银行在结汇过程中，资产负债一起胀大，而银行找央行结汇中，央行资产负债也同样胀大。100美元从我的手里跑到央行手里，银行和央行的资产负债表都增加了100美元/650元人民币的规模。这一点是非常反直觉的，大家容易觉得外汇市场像股票市场一样，我的钱少了你的钱多了，你的股票少了我的股票多了，钱和股票在来回的流动。事实上完全不是。

综上，外汇储备的形成，不但使央行负债侧的基础货币胀大，同时也是银行负债侧的货币量增长。如果银行自己持有外汇而不存入央行，则外汇储备和央行资产负债表不会变大，基础货币也不会变化，但银行负债侧的货币量增加了，所以会出现准备金率下降的状况。2008年以前之所以不停提高准备金率，乃是市场主体找银行结汇和银行找央行结汇共同的结果。如果银行自身忙着拿外汇在国外收购银行而不找人民银行结汇，央行反而需要降准，这恐怕也是人们过去疏于考虑的。

央行系列资产负债表分析实例：货币政策

对人民银行来说，货币政策在实际当中包括数量和价格两个内容。资产负债表无法表现出价格，但可以描绘数量。在数量上，我们又能看到人行可以通过三个途径影响货币量，即自身资产侧、自身负债侧以及银行负债侧（注意央行负债侧操作和银行资产侧是统一的）。这里又体现出了货币分析的一个好处，即我们的思考可以从一般原理出发来推测可能的操作，而不是从已有的操作出发来归结原理。

比如说，央行资产侧有什么？无非是实体的东西、债权、股权等。实体的东西就是黄金。央行抛售黄金可以回收货币，央行买入黄金当然可以发行货币；央行抛售国债可以回收货币，央行买入国债可以发行货币；央行卖出股票可以收回货币，入股企业可以发行货币。当然，我们知道货币是银行存款债务／央行纸币债务，所以上述操作如果能够直接和货币挂钩，意味着央行和非银行部门在交易。

如果央行和银行部门交易的话，对货币量就没有直接的影响了。银行债务是银行与债权人之间的事，央行不可能和银行一起对银行债务有任何触动，必须要涉及银行债权人。因此，央行和银行的交易影响的，要么是银行对央行的负债／股权，要么是银行资产间的转换。比如央行发行纸硬币是影响银行资产中库存现金资产和在央行存款的操作，比如央行发行央票是影响银行资产中央行票据和在央行存款的操作；比如央行再贷款/逆回购是影响银行资产侧在央行存款和负债侧对央行负债的操作，这在2015年8月非常明显。

央票是个非常特殊的政策，因为发行央票不涉及央行的资产侧，而是央行几种负债间的分类调整，因此巨大的央票发行会对基础货币造成扰动。如果分析人士打算采用所谓“货币乘数”这个纸币时代的指标来做研究，就必须要考虑到央票对于储备货币的分流，而在央票鼎盛的时代，央票的规模基本和储备货币规模相当，忽视央票就会犯错误了。

和央票类似的是财政存款，因为财政存款帐户也开在央行负债侧，所以涉及到财政收支的操作也会对基础货币造成扰动。另一个扰动就是前面提到的纸硬币发行。这是两个非常有中国特色的操作，每年的12月都会有万亿级别的财政存款的支出，导致银行间流动性充裕，央行公开市场操作被动从紧，而每年的1月/2月都有万亿级别的纸币投放，银行用准备金存款去换纸币导致银行间流动性紧张，央行公开市场操作被动宽松。所谓“被动”，意味着央行只是在适应市场状况，其宽松或从紧都没有任何的政策意图。

央行系列资产负债表分析实例：银行运行

银行运行中有两个很深刻的问题，一个是75%的存贷比是否合理，一个是准备金率能否超过100%。从其它存款性公司资产负债表上，我们能看到银行对非金融部门的债权以及非金融部门在银行的存款，同时我们也能看到银行在央行的准备金存款，以及准备金率的分母——非金融部门在银行的存款。当然上述的口径都较为粗略，并不完全对应，只是用于简要的分析。

在纸币是货币主要形式的时代，银行收到纸币并创造存款给客户，银行资产侧的纸币和负债侧的存款同时增加，客户手里的纸币减少但存款增加。而银行发放贷款同时支出纸币，在这个过程中纸币减少而贷款资产增加，对于融资人而言则是债务增加伴随资产侧纸币增加。整个过程中，我们看到银行之所以能够贷款，乃是因为有了存款者存入的纸币。在这个时期，存款是贷款的前提，或者说存款创造贷款。

在上述机制下，如果融资人把纸币又存入了银行，银行留下一部分之后继续通过贷款投放纸币，我们会看到经典教材中描述的货币创造机制，即存入纸币-贷款支出纸币-再存入纸币等一系列操作，导致银行贷款和存款不停的增长，每次新增的贷款都少于上一次的存款，差距是留存在银行手里作为准备金的纸币。

在这个情况下，存贷比的意义，就是让银行不要放贷太多，不然储户提现的时候就要出现流动性问题。而准备金率的意义也是如此。所以我们看存贷比存在上限，而准备金率存在下限。不过这里还是有一个小区别：存款和贷款都只和银行自己有关，而准备金率中的准备金，则同时是央行的负债，和央行的操作有关，后面我们还会仔细说。

但是现在，银行存款已经成为了主要的货币形式，实际操作中存款和贷款的关系已经变化。银行放贷不再伴随着纸币的投放，而是直接伴随着存款的增加，变成了贷款创造存款。银行的准备金也不是一种把存入的纸币留存后放贷的结果，因为银行放贷当中根本不涉及纸币，银行在央行的准备金存款也不会因银行扩张自己的资产和负债而受到任何影响，因为整个放贷操作和央行没有任何关系。

当贷款直接创造存款，而不是存款带来纸币——贷款投放纸币——投放的纸币再存入形成存款，我们会发现存款并不是贷款的保证，并不创造贷款，而相反贷款是存款的原因，贷款是1:1创造存款。而且和存入纸币后贷出纸币不同，现在贷款和存款是完全同时等量产生，没有任何时间间隔。也就是说，银行贷款产生存款的过程，会使得存贷比趋于100%而不是75%。

而越来越丰富的金融工具也让存款和贷款进一步脱节。比如银行向储户发行债券，使储户存款减少，持有的债券增加，但银行资产没有任何变化。可是，存款准备金率的分母变小了，存贷比的分母也变小了，使得存贷比和银行的存款准备金率都提高了。如果银行存款一夜之间都变成了银行债券，我们会发现银行的存贷比会无限大，存款准备金率会无限大。

当然，在纸币时代，我们也可以搞上述策略，比如一些储户取出银行所有的纸币用来买银行债，银行这边看到纸币被取出然后又在购债中流入。然后另一些储户又取出纸币然后买债，这个过程的结果就是存款全部转化为债券，而银行资产侧的纸币和贷款都不变。但当存款创造贷款的意识根深蒂固，人们认为没有存款就无法有贷款、给存款和贷款间增加了本不存在的绑定之后，人们就失去了想象存款还能变成别的东西的能力，产生了准备金率不能超过100%的幻觉。

之所以75%存贷比在长期里得以维持，乃是因为前面所说的结汇操作，使得银行负债侧产生了大量的存款，但资产侧增加的不是贷款而是外汇。这些外汇放到央行之后对银行来说就变成了准备金存款。这个机制使得银行在贷款1:1创造存款的同时，还能通过结汇创造更多的存款，使得贷款的增长速度比存款要慢，75%的比率得以维持。

但当银行发现，自己负债侧的人民币存款要么变成了外币存款留下，要么变为外币存款后汇出，于是自己贷款资产没少但人民币存款急剧下降时，75%也就再难维持，历史的巧合就被金融的规律所取代。这就是为什么在2013年的时候影子银行特别盛行的一个原因之一，因为银行再也不能从容地游走在75%以下了。而2015年存贷比成为观测指标之后，银行存贷比迅速上升，811汇改更加剧了这一点。

如果2015年存贷比还是个硬指标，那么811汇改后，大量人民币存款直接离境或者变成外汇存款，而人民币贷款还在，分母变小分子不变，银行就要疯了，绝对要停止放贷或者搞各种非贷款类信贷，这对于实体经济而言都是伤害。当然，2015年的地方债置换把大量贷款转化为债券，算是帮助了银行降低存贷比，但还是杯水车薪。很难想象财政部、央行和银监会在地方债务置换、汇改和取消存贷比方面有政策协调。

至于个别银行的存贷比，比如邮储银行存贷比特别低等，则和每个银行的业务模式有关。比如邮储银行的储户们把很多存款转到邮储银行，而邮储银行贷款业务跟不上存款转来的速度，这就造成了邮储银行存贷比很低的现象。而对存款的转出行来说，贷款不变，存款减少，存贷比当然有增高的压力。当然，不能把邮储银行的低存贷比当成是其他银行守不住存贷比的原因。

而准备金率和存贷比还不一样，因为准备金规模有央行的意志在里面，对银行来说不是一个内生的变量，央行可以通过公开市场操作调节准备金规模，通过影响准备金率分子的方法来影响银行准备金率，并通过要求银行满足法定准备金要求而约束一般存款的规模。但我们知道，货币量的增长受到多种因素决定，银行能够决定是否放贷，但他很难拒绝储户结汇，因此央行会陷入一种追及游戏。出口商不停结汇扩大货币量，央行不停提高准备金率，结果约束了银行通过贷款创造的货币量，板子都打在贷款方身上，却对结汇者无可奈何。而反过来，央行降低准备金率之后，又面临了银行愿不愿意放贷来扩大货币量的问题。由此我们看到，准备金率提高的时候可能会出现打击面过大的问题，准备金率降低的时候可能会出现银行不配合的问题。

以上便是关于央行系列资产负债表的一些简单讨论。货币银行体系非常复杂，我自己也在努力探索，非常期待能够和各位读者多多交流。

The balance sheet is dynamic, reflecting the tangible results of active operations and transactions. The significance of comparing sizes and trends individually is limited. When studying the changes of a specific indicator, one must consider its impact on other indicators. This is the requirement of double-entry accounting and showcases its power. Each operation involves a debit and a credit, and every transaction involves both a buyer and a seller, necessitating a simultaneous consideration of impacts on both sides.

Economic activities have two facets: the tangible side and the monetary side. Our daily necessities, such as food, clothing, shelter, and transportation, are tangible, consisting of goods and services. However, our lives are also intertwined with money, currency, funds, etc. We use money to buy things, speculate in stocks, and lend money to others. The combination of tangibles and money constitutes our economic activities, and economists who study economic activities approach their research from both tangible and monetary angles.

Macro-economists have traditionally focused on tangible activities since the time of Adam Smith, as he believed they represent the true wealth of a nation, which is undoubtedly accurate. However, money has consistently been a part of our economic activities, and the emphasis on money by mercantilists cannot be completely discarded, and the analysis of money continues. To track the monetary aspect of economic operations, we need to delve into the series of balance sheets published by the central bank – the central bank's balance sheet, the balance sheet of other deposit-taking corporations, and an overview of deposit-taking corporations.

Introduction to the Central Bank Series of Balance Sheets

Deposit-taking corporations encompass the monetary authority (central bank) and other deposit-taking corporations. Within the central bank's balance sheet, the balance sheet of other deposit-taking corporations, and the overview of deposit-taking corporations, we should first focus on the overview of deposit-taking corporations, as it contains a crucial indicator: money and quasi-money. Money comprises two items (currency in circulation and demand deposits), while quasi-money comprises three items (time deposits, personal deposits, other deposits). Among these, currency in circulation is the paper and coin currency issued by the central bank; the rest are bank deposits, and their issuers/liabilities are different.

Apart from a significant indicator, there's another vital equation: foreign net assets + domestic credit = money and quasi-money + deposits not included in broad money + bonds + paid-up capital + others (net). This equation reveals how money and quasi-money are created. Foreign net assets and domestic credit create M2, while deposits not included in broad money, bonds, paid-up capital, etc., divert M2; for example, deposits that were originally part of M2 shift out, or they're used to purchase bank bonds/equity.

The central bank's balance sheet and the balance sheet of other deposit-taking corporations collectively form the deposit-taking corporations' overview. The balance sheet of other deposit-taking corporations includes all four types of deposits within M2. Thus, we can observe changes in the most critical part of M2 from the balance sheet of other deposit-taking corporations. For instance, when a bank issues a mortgage loan, homebuyers have more deposits, increasing M2; when a bank issues bonds to businesses, corporate deposits decrease, and their holdings of bank bonds increase, decreasing M2.

The central bank's balance sheet depicts the relationship between its assets and liabilities. The central bank's interactions with non-bank institutions and individuals are fewer compared to banks. This mainly occurs through the issuance of paper and coin currency and fiscal deposits. Individuals and businesses rarely have deposit accounts with the central bank, although theoretically it's not impossible. However, the central bank's assets mainly relate to non-bank institutions, including foreign institutions (foreign exchange), governments (bonds), and non-bank financial institutions (AMCs, securities companies, etc.), with foreign assets constituting the largest portion.

In conclusion, the balance sheet is dynamic, reflecting the tangible results of active operations and transactions. The significance of comparing sizes and trends individually is limited. When studying the changes of a specific indicator, one must consider its impact on other indicators. This is the requirement of double-entry accounting and showcases its power. Each operation involves a debit and a credit, and every transaction involves both a buyer and a seller, necessitating a simultaneous consideration of impacts on both sides.

Example of Analyzing Central Bank Series of Balance Sheets: Foreign Exchange Reserves

The formation of foreign exchange reserves is the outcome of a series of operations. This result is reflected in the $3.2 trillion foreign exchange reserve size and also in the ¥24.2 trillion central bank foreign assets - foreign exchange, commonly referred to as foreign exchange deposits. As mentioned earlier, we need to observe the debit and credit impacts of each operation and the effects of each transaction on both the buyer and the seller. Only then can we fulfill the requirements of double-entry accounting and fully understand a process.

The central bank only interacts with banks, and the central bank cannot create foreign exchange assets for itself (though there are rumors of North Korea having a specialized agency producing counterfeit Chinese currency; authenticity unknown, but if true, the North Korean central bank could potentially create foreign exchange reserves for itself). Thus, apart from the operational income of foreign exchange reserves, the central bank's foreign exchange assets are all outcomes of interactions with banks. This leads us to the two parties in the interaction: foreign exchange reduction in banks and foreign exchange increase in the central bank. Each operation also involves a credit and a debit. Foreign exchange in banks cannot decrease without corresponding increases in other assets, decreases in liabilities, or reductions in equity.

Within the foreign exchange operations mentioned earlier, we can see that the relationship between banks and the central bank is not as simple as exchanging money for goods; rather, it's giving goods on credit. The central bank increases its foreign exchange assets while also increasing its debt to banks, while banks increase their deposits with the central bank and decrease their foreign exchange assets. This is not a typical "money for goods" transaction but a "credit transaction." This occurs due to the special nature of bank and central bank liabilities: the paper and coin currency in central bank liabilities are legal tender, and the deposits in central bank liabilities can be converted into legal tender like paper and coin currency at any time. Thus, the central bank has the confidence to provide its debt to banks and conclude the transaction. From a currency perspective, this is the issuance of base money; from a transaction perspective, this is a credit transaction.

But where does the foreign exchange in banks come from? It's certainly not counterfeit US dollars printed by Chinese banks; rather, it's obtained by non-bank institutions through trade or investment and then deposited in banks. Although we can't see much foreign exchange on the asset side of banks because they give it to the central bank, we can still see the impact of foreign exchange on the banking system from two indicators. First, the enormous amount of deposits/reserve currency held by banks at the central bank is an outcome of the exchange. Second, within M2 on the liability side of banks, a portion originates from non-bank entities' foreign exchange transactions.

In essence, when banks engage in foreign exchange transactions, both assets and liabilities expand. As foreign exchange flows from my hands to the central bank, the balance sheets of banks and the central bank increase by the size of the transaction, for example, $100 or ¥650. This might seem counterintuitive, as foreign exchange markets are often perceived similar to stock markets, where if I have less money, you have more money, and if I have fewer stocks, you have more stocks, with money and stocks flowing back and forth. However, this is not the case.

In conclusion, the formation of foreign exchange reserves not only enlarges the central bank's liability side of base money but also increases the money supply on the liability side of banks. If banks hold foreign exchange themselves without depositing it with the central bank, foreign exchange reserves and the central bank's balance sheet won't expand, and base money won't change, but the money supply on the bank's liability side will increase, leading to a decrease in the reserve requirement ratio. The constant increase in the reserve requirement ratio until 2008 was a combined outcome of market participants exchanging with banks and banks exchanging with the central bank. If banks are busy using foreign exchange to acquire foreign banks rather than exchanging it with the People's Bank of China, the central bank might need to lower reserve requirements, a consideration that has been neglected in the past.

Analysis Example of Central Bank Series of Balance Sheets: Monetary Policy

For the central bank, monetary policy in practice encompasses two aspects: quantity and price. While the balance sheet cannot depict price, it can illustrate quantity. In terms of quantity, we can see that the central bank can influence the money supply through three avenues: its own asset side, its own liability side, and the liability side of banks (note that central bank liability operations and bank asset operations are unified). This reflects one of the benefits of monetary analysis, which is that our thinking can begin with general principles to speculate on potential operations, rather than deducing principles from existing operations.

For example, what does the central bank have on its asset side? It's nothing more than tangible assets, claims, equities, etc. Tangible assets refer to gold. The central bank can sell gold to recover currency, and buying gold can naturally result in currency issuance. Selling government bonds allows the central bank to retrieve currency, and purchasing government bonds can lead to currency issuance. Selling stocks allows the central bank to retrieve currency, while investing in enterprises can lead to currency issuance. Of course, we know that currency is bank deposit liabilities/central bank currency liabilities, so if the above operations can be directly linked to currency, it means that the central bank and non-bank entities are engaging in transactions.

If the central bank were to transact with the banking sector, there would be no direct impact on the money supply. Bank liabilities are a matter between banks and creditors; the central bank cannot have any direct influence on bank liabilities without involving bank creditors. Therefore, the impact of transactions between the central bank and banks is either the bank's liabilities/equities to the central bank or the conversion of assets among banks. For instance, when the central bank issues paper currency and coins, it affects the stock of cash assets on the bank's asset side and the deposits held at the central bank. Similarly, when the central bank issues central bank bills through reverse repos, it affects the central bank bill assets on the bank's asset side and the liabilities to the central bank on the liability side. This was particularly evident in August 2015.

Central bank bills are a very special policy because their issuance doesn't involve the central bank's asset side; instead, it's a classification adjustment among several types of central bank liabilities. Therefore, a large issuance of central bank bills can disrupt the base money. If analysts intend to use the so-called "money multiplier," an indicator from the era of paper currency, for research, they must consider the diversion of reserve currency due to central bank bills. During the peak of central bank bill issuance, the scale of central bank bills was roughly equivalent to the scale of reserve currency. Neglecting central bank bills would be a mistake.

Similar to central bank bills, there are fiscal deposits. Since fiscal deposit accounts are also located on the central bank's liability side, operations related to fiscal revenue and expenditure can also disrupt the base money. Another disruption is the issuance of paper currency mentioned earlier. These are two unique operations in China. In December of each year, trillions of fiscal deposits are spent, leading to ample interbank liquidity. This causes the central bank's open market operations to tighten. In January/February of each year, trillions of paper currency are injected, causing banks to exchange reserve deposits for paper currency and leading to interbank liquidity tightening. The so-called "passive" indicates that the central bank is adapting to market conditions, and its tightening or loosening doesn't carry any policy intent.

Analysis Example of Central Bank Series of Balance Sheets: Banking Operations

There are two profound issues in banking operations: whether a 75% deposit-to-loan ratio is reasonable and whether the reserve requirement ratio can exceed 100%. From the balance sheet of other deposit-taking corporations, we can observe the bank's claims on non-financial sectors and non-financial sector deposits in banks. Additionally, we can see the bank's reserve deposits at the central bank, as well as the denominator of the reserve requirement ratio—the non-financial sector deposits in banks. Of course, these approaches are relatively rough and not entirely accurate; they are used for brief analysis.

In the era when paper currency is the primary form of money, banks receive paper currency and create deposits for customers. The paper currency on the bank's asset side and the deposits on the liability side both increase. While the paper currency in the hands of customers decreases, their deposits increase. When banks issue loans, they spend paper currency, which results in a decrease in paper currency and an increase in loan assets. For borrowers, this is accompanied by an increase in liabilities and an increase in paper currency on the asset side. Throughout this process, we can see that banks can lend because they have received paper currency from depositors. In this period, deposits are a prerequisite for loans, or rather, deposits create loans.

In this mechanism, if borrowers deposit paper currency back into the bank, the bank retains a portion and continues to lend paper currency through loans. We would then observe the money creation process described in classic textbooks, where operations such as depositing paper currency, lending paper currency, and depositing paper currency again occur in sequence. This leads to the continuous growth of bank loans and deposits, with each new loan being less than the previous deposit. The difference is retained by the bank as reserve currency.

In this situation, the significance of the deposit-to-loan ratio is to prevent banks from lending too much; otherwise, liquidity problems would arise when depositors withdraw funds. Similarly, the significance of the reserve requirement ratio is similar. However, there is a slight difference here: deposits and loans are only related to the bank itself, while reserve deposits in the reserve requirement ratio are also liabilities of the central bank and are related to central bank operations. We will discuss this in more detail later.

However, in the present era, bank deposits have become the main form of money, and the relationship between deposits and loans has changed in practical operations. Bank lending is no longer accompanied by an increase in paper currency; instead, it directly corresponds to an increase in deposits, becoming a process of loan creation leading to deposits. Bank reserve deposits are not a result of retaining paper currency after its deposit, as lending operations do not involve paper currency. The bank's reserve deposits at the central bank are also unaffected by the bank's expansion of assets and liabilities, as lending operations have no relation to the central bank.

When loans directly create deposits rather than deposits leading to lending, we find that deposits are not a guarantee for loans and do not create loans. On the contrary, loans are the cause of deposits; loans create deposits at a 1:1 ratio. Unlike the scenario of depositing paper currency and then lending paper currency, loans and deposits are now generated simultaneously and in equal amounts, without any time gap. This means that the process where bank loans create deposits will tend to approach 100%, not 75%.

Furthermore, the proliferation of financial instruments has further disconnected deposits from loans. For example, banks issue bonds to depositors, causing deposits to decrease and holdings of bonds to increase. However, there is no change in the bank's assets. Nonetheless, the denominator of the deposit reserve ratio is reduced, and the denominator of the deposit-to-loan ratio is also reduced, leading to higher values for both ratios. If overnight, bank deposits are all transformed into bank bonds, we would observe an infinite deposit-to-loan ratio and an infinite deposit reserve ratio.

Of course, even in the era of paper currency, we can adopt the strategies mentioned above. For example, some depositors withdraw all paper currency from banks to buy bank bonds. Banks notice that paper currency is withdrawn and then flows into bond purchases. Then, other depositors withdraw paper currency and buy bonds. The result of this process is that all deposits are converted into bonds, while the bank's paper currency on the asset side and loans remain unchanged. However, when the belief that loans are created only if deposits exist becomes deeply ingrained, and the linkage between deposits and loans is created where none existed, people lose the ability to imagine that deposits can transform into something else. An illusion forms that the reserve requirement ratio cannot exceed 100%.

The reason why the 75% deposit-to-loan ratio has been maintained in the long term is due to the foreign exchange settlement operation mentioned earlier. This operation causes banks' liability side to generate a large amount of deposits, but the increase in assets is not loans but rather foreign exchange. After these foreign exchange assets are handed over to the central bank, they become reserve deposits for banks. This mechanism allows banks to simultaneously create deposits through lending at a 1:1 ratio and create more deposits through foreign exchange settlement, resulting in loan growth slower than deposit growth. This helps maintain the 75% ratio.

However, when banks discover that their RMB deposits on the liability side have either become foreign currency deposits that remain or have been converted and transferred abroad, causing a sharp decrease in RMB deposits, it becomes difficult to maintain the 75% ratio. Historical coincidence is replaced by the laws of finance. This is one of the reasons why shadow banking was particularly prevalent in 2013, as banks could no longer easily operate below the 75% threshold. After the deposit-to-loan ratio became an observed indicator in 2015, it quickly rose, and the currency reform of August 11, 2015, further intensified this.

If the deposit-to-loan ratio were still a rigid indicator in 2015, after the currency reform of August 11, a large amount of RMB deposits directly left the country or were converted into foreign currency deposits, while RMB loans remained. With the denominator decreasing and the numerator unchanged, banks would face difficulties and might have to stop lending or engage in various non-loan credit activities, harming the real economy. Of course, the local government debt swap in 2015 helped banks reduce their deposit-to-loan ratio by converting a large amount of loans into bonds, but it was just a drop in the bucket. It's hard to imagine that the Ministry of Finance, the central bank, and the China Banking Regulatory Commission had coordinated policies on local government debt swaps, currency reform, and the cancellation of deposit-to-loan ratios.

As for individual banks' deposit-to-loan ratios, such as Postal Savings Bank of China having an exceptionally low ratio, it is related to each bank's business model. For example, depositors at Postal Savings Bank of China transferred a lot of deposits to the bank, and the bank's lending business could not keep up with the speed of deposit inflow, resulting in a very low deposit-to-loan ratio for the bank. For banks with deposit outflows, where loans remain constant while deposits decrease, there is naturally pressure to increase the deposit-to-loan ratio. However, Postal Savings Bank of China's low deposit-to-loan ratio cannot be taken as the reason for other banks' inability to maintain their deposit-to-loan ratios.

The reserve requirement ratio is different from the deposit-to-loan ratio, as the reserve deposit scale involves the will of the central bank and is not an endogenous variable for banks. The central bank can adjust the reserve deposit scale through open market operations, affect the reserve requirement ratio's numerator to influence the bank's reserve requirement ratio, and constrain the scale of general deposits by requiring banks to meet the statutory reserve requirements. However, we know that the growth of the money supply is determined by various factors. While banks can decide whether to lend, they are unlikely to refuse depositors' foreign exchange settlements. Thus, the central bank becomes entangled in a chasing game. Exporters continuously settle in foreign exchange to expand the money supply, and the central bank continually raises the reserve requirement ratio, restricting the growth of the money supply created through loans. The burden is placed on the loan side while having no recourse against the settlement party. Conversely, when the central bank lowers the reserve requirement ratio, it faces the challenge of whether banks are willing to cooperate and expand the money supply through lending. From this, we can see that raising the reserve requirement ratio may lead to an overly large negative impact, and lowering it may result in banks not cooperating.

The above is a simple discussion on the central bank's series of balance sheets. The monetary and banking systems are extremely complex, and I am actively exploring them. I look forward to engaging in more discussions with readers.