如何辨析“藏汇于民”与“资本外逃”?How to distinguish "hiding foreign exchange among the people" from "capital flight"?

2015-09-12 央行观察

在上一篇文章《跨境流动的“资金”到底是什么?》中,尝试讨论了“资金”就是境外存款的观点,而本文则尝试讨论结售汇与境内外币存款的问题。

在黄金退出流通的当今世界,外汇成为清偿对外债务和购买国外商品与服务的支付手段,具体表现为在境外银行的存款。例如一位中国留学生想要缴纳在美国的学费,最简单的办法就是在美国的某家银行拥有一存款帐户,然后用在该银行的存款缴纳学费,而缴费的动作和学生的国籍以及所在地无关:使用电子银行,即使学生身在中国,也可以缴纳美国学费。

更多的情况下,中国境内个人在国外没有银行帐户,无法以上述方式交学费。比较常见的方式是所谓电汇,即学生在中国,将其在某中国境内银行的人民币存款转化为美元存款后,将美元存款汇往学校在美国某银行的存款帐户。但人们往往不清楚的是,银行自身也要在资产侧进行调节,以完成汇款操作。

显然,若在中国境内的银行仅持有办公楼等固定资产,则学生必定面临购汇后无外币可汇的情况,正如学生持有人民币存款也无法取现一样。之所以两者相似,因为外币和人民币纸币都是商业银行的资产,本身外生于商业银行体系,并非银行存款那样可以由银行自身创造。外币的产生取决于国外银行,人民币纸币的产生取决于境内央行,都和境内商业银行无关。

所以学生购汇后将美元存款电汇出国,其成功与否,取决于开户银行自身是否有可转移的外币资产。这种外币资产有两种可能性,一种情况是该开户银行直接在境外银行就有存款,该情况下,开户银行在学生汇款的同时,也将自身持有的境外银行存款转移给学生就读学校的开户银行,使学校的开户行一方面增加自身资产,一方面增加学校的存款。两家境外银行之间甚至可以进一步使用在境外央行的存款头寸相互清算。

另一种情况下,汇款学生的境内开户银行本身并无境外银行的存款,而是持有另一境内机构的外币存款。这一机构可以是人行,也可以是中行等另外一家商业银行。在这种情况下,学生对开户银行的转帐指令,导致了开户银行对人行或中行的转帐指令,而人行或中行相应转移其在境外银行的存款给学校的开户银行,学生境内开户行在人行或中行的外币存款减少,学生在开户行的外币存款减少,境外学校的开户行的资产和存款负债增加。

境外向境内汇外币则是反向操作。例如,在纽约花旗银行开户的美国进口商,向在北京银行开户的中国出口商汇美元。这一看似简单的汇款的过程,很可能是中行纽约分行资产侧增加了同业美元存款或在联储的美元存款,同时让中行总行在诸如联行存放的帐户增加了在中行纽分的美元存款,而中总知道这笔增加的美元资产,对应了北京银行在它这里的美元存款的增加,而北京银行也知道自己在中总的美元存款的增加,对应的是中国出口商在它这里的美元存款增加。但即使增加了这样多的美元存款,真正算作“外汇”的,其实只是中行纽约分行持有的那笔美元同业。

一个真实的例子,是2007年央行采取的以外汇交存人民币准备金的政策。我们知道商业银行在人行本来就有外币准备金存款,因此银行在央行有外币存款并不让人意外。但外汇交存人民币准备金的会计核算,则让人们看到了外币存款的交存过程。央行的银办发[2007]179号提到:

“商业银行向人民银行购买外汇交存存款准备金,会计分录是:①借:××金融机构准备金存款(人民币),贷:1350国家外汇人民币资金——外汇交存人民币存款准备金占款(人民币)②借:1010存放金融机构——储备司(美元),贷:××金融机构准备金存款——交存人民币存款准备金(美元)。商业银行直接以外汇交存存款准备金,会计分录是:借:1010存放金融机构——中国银行(美元),贷:××金融机构准备金存款——交存人民币存款准备金(美元)。”

这段话的意思是:如果商业银行向人行购汇交存,则银行在人行的人民币准备金存款减少,相应使人行资产侧外汇占款减少。同时,人行在储备司的美元存放增加,银行在人行的美元存款增加。另一种模式是银行直接以外汇交存。人行要求商业银行把外汇直接交给人行在中行的美元存放帐户,这一操作同时增加银行在人行的美元存款。这段会计分录有两个解读事项。

首先,人行和外汇储备的关系,在资产负债表上并不只是体现在外汇占款项目下,而应该还有其他的项目。存放在储备司,相当于储备司增加了外币债务,这应该和外汇占款项目下,央行和储备司是类似基金投资者与基金那样的股权投资关系不同。央行和外汇储备的关系,看来和一个买了工商银行股票的工商银行储户一样,储户既是工商银行的股东,也是债权人。

这样的既存款又投资的安排,当然和人行负债侧的情况有关。银行在人行的人民币存款能换多少美元,人行可以提出一个价格,因此人行可以将走外汇占款科目的外币看作是自己的资产。需要说明的是,由于人行有维系汇率稳定的责任,因此人行对于汇率的议价能力也受到一定限制,即人行处于一种自由固定价格兑换与完全不兑换之间的状态,数量上不自由,价格上不固定。

但央行对于银行在它这里的外币存款则态度不同,因为外币存款和外币资产都是外币计价,银行要求转帐给境外一方时,央行并没有汇率可以调整,因此央行对于银行在自己这里的外币存款,用自己在储备司的外币存款与之对应,是很妥当的做法,这也和人行与中行的操作类似。至于储备司如何应对由央行持有的外币负债,则是储备司的事情,它可以安于在境外银行持有存款,也可以稍微激进一些,买入债券甚至其他资产。

因此我们可以看出,银行在人行的外币存款,是通过人行对其持有的境外存款的调动权利。这正如储户持有的人民币存款,本身并不是纸币,而是对纸币的取现权利一样。所以外汇局近来对购汇的打击,其一重目的,乃是在于断绝购汇产生的对外汇款的可能性。而一旦完全断绝这种可能性,央行和银行就可以将自己手中的境外存款自由使用,而不必担心储户在某个时候要求直接持有这些境外存款,央行和银行对汇率的干预能力得以维持。

除了这种调动权利,储户持有外币计价存款,还使得自己面临汇率风险,以及接受外币存款利率。对于以人民币计利润和权益的境内主体,持有升值外币资产将使自身的人民币利润增加,即使该主体没有从事任何其它经济活动。反之,持有贬值外币将使自身的人民币利润减少或产生损失。

在人民币不断升值的年代里,出口商把收到的外汇都换成人民币,避免了持有外币头寸导致的人民币计价利润减少或产生损失。但银行还持有外币头寸,无论这一头寸表现为银行直接在境外的外币存款,还是通过中行持有的外币存款,都会导致币种错配的损失。银行摆脱币种错配的办法,是拿着外币找人行结汇,使自身原先的外币计价资产变为人民币资产,从而和负债侧出口商的人民币存款对应。

如果人民银行把这些外汇存到中行并结汇,虽然人行自身的币种错配问题解决了,但中行开始承担币种错配的风险。现实当中,人行成为了这些外币的最终持有人,而由于人民银行会计制度是历史成本法,加上对于汇率的控制能力,使得汇率对人行的影响与对银行的影响不同,这已经在之前的文章中多次讨论过。

结售汇本身不是境外资产所有权的跨境转移,它只是使得负债方的币种结构变化而已。如果仅是因客户购汇而在境内银行负债侧形成外汇存款,则商业银行会向央行购汇以应对潜在的跨境汇款(流动性风险)和实在的汇率风险。这一操作将使商业银行在人行的人民币准备金减少,也使得外汇占款减少,但是并不意味着人行的外汇储备也必然减少,因为商业银行可以在人行持有与原先人民币准备金等值的美元存款,对应着人行的外汇储备。人行和商业银行反而因为储户购汇而摆脱了部分外汇风险敞口,即外汇储备对应着银行在人行的外汇存款,而商业银行在人行的外汇存款对应了客户在银行的外汇存款,而客户开始承担这一风险。

银行客户的结售汇会影响汇率,因为银行为了应对客户的结售汇的操作,本身要调整自身的资产币种,客户的购汇使银行增持外币计价资产。需要注意的是,客户和银行以及银行与央行之间的操作都是结售汇,即负债币种结构变化,而银行之间则是各自资产的买卖,即资产结构变化。因此外汇局对购汇的打击的第二重目的,即缓解对人民币汇率的压力。少一些客户购汇,就少一些银行购汇,也就少一些人民币的卖盘和对央行干预的需要。

客户持有在境内银行的外汇存款,和在境外银行持有外汇存款,两者看似都是“藏汇于民”,但仍有差异。储户在境内银行的外汇存款能否全额跨境汇出,取决于外汇储备和银行外汇资产的情况,如果外汇储备或银行外汇资产流动性不好,在兑换境外存款的过程中减损较大,或者数量少于客户外汇存款规模,则储户的利益并不能完全被满足。所以藏汇于民应该也有不同的层次。

而如果把“藏汇于民”放在“金融机构外汇流动性十分充裕”与“企业和个人外汇存款持续增加”这两点上考察,则有两点需要注意。第一点在于,当企业和个人不断将人民币存款变为外币存款时,银行为了避免流动性和汇率风险,自然也会在资产侧配置更多外币流动资产,例如在人行用人民币存款换外币存款。而当企业和个人对外转帐的时候,我们看到的将是“金融机构外汇流动性”和“企业和个人外汇存款”的同时减少,而不可能是“企业和个人外汇存款”减少,但“金融机构外汇流动性”依然充裕。两者是拴在一起的,来的时候一起来,走的时候一起走,不能加总来看。

第二点在于,“企业和个人外汇存款”可以是境内银行扩张资产负债表的结果,本身也可以通过外币贷款创造。外币存款不是美元纸币,银行不需要美联储的印钞机也可以给客户发放美元贷款,同时创造美元存款。其关键在于是否有“金融机构外汇流动性”来满足客户的跨境汇款需要。所以关注“企业和个人外汇存款”时,要关注贷款以及准备金率,即“金融机构外汇流动性”与“企业和个人外汇存款”的比率。因此,“金融机构外汇流动性”和“企业和个人外汇存款”有相互的关联,不能简单加总看是否充裕,也不能单独来看多寡,而恐怕要联系起来观察,才能准确把握。

In the previous article "What Exactly is the 'Funds' in Cross-Border Flows?", an attempt was made to discuss the viewpoint that "funds" are overseas deposits. This article attempts to discuss the issues of foreign exchange settlement and domestic and foreign currency deposits.

In today's world where gold has exited circulation, foreign exchange has become the means of payment for settling foreign debt and purchasing foreign goods and services, specifically in the form of deposits in overseas banks. For instance, a Chinese student studying abroad who wants to pay tuition in the United States can simply open a deposit account with a bank in the US and use the deposit to pay the tuition, regardless of their nationality or location. Through electronic banking, even if the student is in China, they can pay US tuition.

In most cases, Chinese individuals do not have bank accounts abroad, making it impossible to pay tuition fees in the manner described above. The more common method is electronic remittance, where the student in China converts their RMB deposit into a USD deposit and then transfers the USD deposit to the school's bank account in the US. However, what is often unclear is that the bank itself must make adjustments on the asset side to facilitate the remittance process.

Obviously, if a bank in China holds only fixed assets like office buildings, a student will face the situation where they have no foreign currency to remit after purchasing foreign exchange, just like how they cannot withdraw RMB from RMB deposits. The similarity arises because foreign currency and RMB banknotes are both assets of commercial banks. They are externally generated within the commercial banking system and are not created by banks themselves, unlike bank deposits. The generation of foreign currency depends on foreign banks, while the generation of RMB banknotes depends on domestic central banks, both unrelated to domestic commercial banks.

Therefore, whether a student successfully remits USD deposits after purchasing foreign exchange depends on whether the bank itself has transferable foreign currency assets. There are two possibilities for such foreign currency assets. In one scenario, the bank directly holds deposits with overseas banks. In this case, when the student makes the remittance, the bank also transfers its own deposits with overseas banks to the school's bank account, thus increasing both the school's assets and its deposits. These two overseas banks might even use their deposits with central banks to settle with each other.

In the other scenario, the student's domestic bank itself does not hold deposits with overseas banks but instead holds foreign currency deposits with another domestic institution, which could be the central bank or another commercial bank like the Bank of China. In this case, the student's remittance instruction to their bank leads to the bank's instruction to the central bank or the Bank of China, and they, in turn, transfer their deposits with overseas banks to the school's bank. The student's domestic bank sees a reduction in its foreign currency deposits with the central bank or the Bank of China, and the student's foreign currency deposits with the bank decrease. The assets and deposit liabilities of the school's bank in overseas countries increase.

The process is reversed when foreign currency is remitted from abroad to China. For example, a US importer with an account at Citibank in New York remits USD to a Chinese exporter with an account at Bank of Beijing in China. This seemingly simple remittance process could lead to the asset side of Bank of China New York Branch increasing its interbank USD deposits or its deposits at the Federal Reserve, while simultaneously increasing Bank of China Headquarters' deposits at correspondent banks, including those at Citibank New York Branch. Bank of China Headquarters would then recognize the increase in USD assets, corresponding to the increase in USD deposits at Bank of Beijing, which in turn recognizes the increase in its own USD deposits at Bank of China Headquarters. This interbank relationship might even involve further clearing of deposit positions with their respective central banks.

In a different situation, when a student remits foreign currency deposits from within China to abroad, the domestic bank needs to have a balance of foreign currency deposits abroad. If a student holds a foreign currency deposit with the bank and remits it abroad, the bank's own foreign currency deposit decreases. This balance is a dynamic relationship between the bank and the central bank.

This dynamic relationship is similar to how banks exchange RMB deposits for USD deposits when they sell USD to the central bank. The accounting entry for this exchange is: debit: interbank RMB reserve deposits (RMB), credit: USD deposits – RMB reserve deposits (USD). The central bank increases its USD deposits held in interbank RMB reserve accounts, while the bank decreases its USD deposits held in interbank RMB reserve accounts.

If a bank directly deposits foreign currency with the central bank, the accounting entry is: debit: deposits at correspondent banks – Bank of China (USD), credit: interbank RMB reserve deposits – foreign currency reserve deposits (USD). This scenario directly increases the bank's USD deposits held in interbank RMB reserve accounts.

This accounting entry has two interpretive elements. First, the relationship between the central bank and foreign exchange reserves is not solely reflected in the foreign exchange deposits item but should also involve other items. Depositing at correspondent banks is equivalent to increasing foreign currency liabilities for the central bank. This differs from the relationship between the central bank and foreign exchange reserves, which has been discussed multiple times before, and is akin to the relationship between a fund investor and a fund where the investor is both a shareholder and a creditor.

The key point in this relationship lies in the central bank's liability side. How much USD a bank's RMB deposit with the central bank can be exchanged for depends on the central bank's pricing. Therefore, the central bank can treat the foreign currency moved in the foreign exchange deposits account as its own assets. It should be noted that due to the central bank's responsibility for maintaining exchange rate stability, its bargaining power for exchange rates is also limited. The central bank operates in a state between free floating and fixed prices for exchange rates, with limitations on both quantity and price.

The central bank treats the bank's foreign currency deposits differently. Since banks remit foreign currency to the central bank, which doesn't involve adjusting exchange rates, the central bank can appropriately treat the bank's foreign currency deposits as corresponding to its own foreign currency deposits in correspondent banks. This is similar to the operation between the central bank and the Bank of China. Regarding how the central bank handles foreign currency liabilities held by itself, it is the central bank's matter; it can either maintain deposits with overseas banks or adopt a slightly more proactive approach, such as buying bonds or other assets.

From this, it can be observed that a bank's foreign currency deposits with the central bank result from the central bank's right to adjust its foreign currency deposits held with overseas banks. This is similar to a depositor's right to withdraw RMB deposits rather than having physical RMB banknotes. Therefore, the recent crackdown by the foreign exchange authority on foreign exchange purchases aims to eliminate the possibility of foreign exchange remittances resulting from such purchases. Once this possibility is completely eliminated, the central bank and the bank can freely use the foreign currency deposits they hold without worrying that depositors will demand to hold these deposits directly. This helps maintain the central bank's and the bank's ability to intervene in the exchange rate.

Apart from this right to adjust, a depositor holding foreign currency-denominated deposits also faces exchange rate risk and accepts the interest rate on foreign currency deposits. For domestic entities whose profits and equity are denominated in RMB, holding appreciating foreign currency assets increases their RMB profits, even without engaging in any other economic activities. Conversely, holding depreciating foreign currency assets decreases their RMB profits or leads to losses.

During the period of continuous RMB appreciation, export-oriented businesses converted their foreign exchange earnings into RMB to avoid reduced RMB-denominated profits or losses due to holding foreign currency positions. However, banks still held foreign currency positions, whether in the form of direct deposits with overseas banks or deposits through the Bank of China. Both scenarios led to losses caused by currency mismatches. To mitigate this, banks sought foreign exchange from the central bank to transform their original foreign currency-denominated assets into RMB assets, aligning with the RMB-denominated deposits of export-oriented businesses.

If the central bank deposits this foreign exchange with the Bank of China and exchanges it for RMB, although the central bank resolves its currency mismatch issue, the Bank of China begins to assume the currency mismatch risk. In reality, the central bank becomes the final holder of this foreign exchange, and due to the historical cost accounting method and its control over exchange rates, the impact of exchange rates on the central bank differs from their impact on banks. This has been discussed multiple times in previous articles.

Foreign exchange settlement itself does not involve the cross-border transfer of ownership of foreign assets; it merely changes the currency structure of liabilities. If foreign currency deposits are formed on the liability side of domestic banks due to customer purchases of foreign exchange, commercial banks will buy foreign exchange from the central bank to manage potential cross-border remittances (liquidity risk) and actual exchange rate risk. This operation leads to a reduction in the RMB reserve deposits of commercial banks with the central bank and a reduction in foreign exchange deposits, but it does not necessarily mean that the central bank's foreign exchange reserves will also decrease. This is because commercial banks can hold USD deposits with the central bank equivalent to their original RMB reserve deposits, corresponding to the central bank's foreign exchange reserves. The central bank and commercial banks actually reduce part of their foreign exchange risk exposure due to customers' foreign exchange purchases. Foreign exchange reserves correspond to the foreign exchange deposits of banks with the central bank, and the foreign exchange deposits of banks with the central bank correspond to the foreign exchange deposits of customers with the banks, with customers beginning to bear this risk.

Customers' foreign exchange settlement and sales operations affect exchange rates because banks need to adjust their currency-denominated assets to manage customer operations. It should be noted that customer operations, bank operations, and operations between banks involve foreign exchange settlement, which changes the currency structure of liabilities. Between banks, there are asset transactions, which change the currency structure of assets. Therefore, the crackdown by the foreign exchange authority on foreign exchange purchases has a second objective, which is to alleviate pressure on the RMB exchange rate. If there are fewer customer purchases of foreign exchange, there will be fewer bank purchases of foreign exchange, resulting in fewer offers of RMB for sale and a reduced need for central bank intervention.

Customers holding foreign exchange deposits with domestic banks and those holding foreign exchange deposits with overseas banks both appear to involve "hiding foreign exchange among the people," but there are still differences. Whether a depositor's foreign exchange deposits with a domestic bank can be fully remitted abroad depends on the situation of foreign exchange reserves and the bank's foreign exchange assets. If foreign exchange reserves or bank foreign exchange assets have poor liquidity and result in significant losses during the process of exchanging for overseas deposits, or if they are insufficient compared to the scale of customers' foreign exchange deposits, the interests of depositors may not be fully met. Therefore, the concept of "hiding foreign exchange among the people" likely has different levels.

When considering the phrase in the context of "ample foreign exchange liquidity in financial institutions" and "continuous increase in foreign exchange deposits by enterprises and individuals," two points need to be noted. Firstly, when enterprises and individuals continuously convert RMB deposits into foreign currency deposits, banks will naturally allocate more liquid foreign currency assets on the asset side to manage liquidity and exchange rate risk. For example, banks will exchange RMB deposits for foreign currency deposits with the central bank. When enterprises and individuals remit money abroad, the simultaneous decrease in "foreign exchange liquidity in financial institutions" and "foreign exchange deposits by enterprises and individuals" is observed. It is not possible for "foreign exchange deposits by enterprises and individuals" to decrease while "foreign exchange liquidity in financial institutions" remains ample. The two are intertwined – when one increases, the other decreases, and vice versa.

Secondly, "foreign exchange deposits by enterprises and individuals" can be the result of a bank expanding its balance sheet, and these deposits can also be created through foreign currency loans. Foreign currency deposits are not physical USD banknotes; banks can issue USD loans to customers without needing to print money through the Federal Reserve, effectively creating USD deposits. The key point lies in whether there is enough "foreign exchange liquidity in financial institutions" to meet customers' cross-border remittance needs. When observing "foreign exchange deposits by enterprises and individuals," it's important to consider loans and reserve ratios, or the ratio between "foreign exchange liquidity in financial institutions" and "foreign exchange deposits by enterprises and individuals." Thus, "foreign exchange liquidity in financial institutions" and "foreign exchange deposits by enterprises and individuals" are interconnected and cannot be simply summed up as being ample or not. They need to be observed in conjunction to gain an accurate understanding.