2015-09-16 央行观察

作者：季天鹤，方正中期研究院研究员，央行观察专栏作家

市场期待已久的8月份央行资产负债表和信贷收支表数据终于出炉。虽然存款性公司概览和其他存款性公司资产负债表没有同时公布，但现有的信息已经足以引发密切关注。

首先按照央行资产负债表的顺序，从央行国外资产开场，这一数据在8月减少了8545亿，除去黄金占款增加的37亿元之外，分别是央行外汇占款减少3184亿和“其他国外资产”减少5398亿。央行解释称：外汇占款降幅按照汇率折算，低于8月份我国外汇储备下降939亿美元（约6000亿人民币）的水平，因除了提供外汇流动性外，当月外汇储备委托贷款项目进行了一些资金提款，国际市场一些主要金融资产价格出现不同程度回调也增大了外汇储备降幅，因此出现了央行外汇占款与外汇储备降幅上的不一致。

而“其他国外资产”的减少，则很难解释。这一数据自2007年7月开始陡升，在2008年6月达到15000亿元，随后不时下降，在2013年１月从2012年底的4077亿跳升之后，就稳定在7400亿元人民币左右。一种资产的变动，要么意味着另一种资产的反向变动，要么意味着一种负债/所有者权益的同向变动。因此，“其它国外资产”项目的减少，意味着其它资产项目的增加，或者负债/所有者权益的减少。

央行对其他存款性公司的债权尽管在8月陡增7435亿元，但考虑央行8月份通过逆回购进行的2100亿流动性注入，8月31日进行为期6天的1400亿SLO，8月28日为期7天的600亿SLO，8月26日的为期6天的1400亿SLO，新增的1100亿MLF和604亿PSL，总计流动性注入已达7204亿，接近7435亿的规模，而上述操作应该都是境内操作，不应该涉及国外资产，因此“其它国外资产”减少的5400亿元对应的，应该不是对银行债权的增加。

有一种观点认为，这些“其它国外资产”对应的，是银行在人行的外币存款，这种说法的思路，是认为银行把外币给央行的时候，会出现结汇持有人民币存款和维持外币存款两种状态，而央行根据银行操作的不同，也把从银行拿到的外币放在不同的类别里，前者自然是外汇占款，而后者则是“其它国外存款”。以目前的信息来看，尚不清楚这种说法是否符合实际的分类，但无论怎样，这部分“其它国外资产”应该是离开了央行，而既然央行资产侧没有其它可能的大幅增加项目，这也意味着央行应该是摆脱了一部分负债。

观察央行的负债侧，我们发现，8月份其他存款性公司在央行的存款仅仅增加了177亿，意味着如果央行没有注入前述7435亿元，以及期间银行没有因财政存款减少而得到2476亿元，银行在央行存款应该减少近9900亿元。造成这一情况的原因，当然是由于银行直接增持了央行的8500多亿国外资产，导致自身在央行人民币存款减少。而银行持有的国外资产，可以从稍后公布的其他存款性公司资产负债表来求证，但很可能出现银行国外资产的增加小于央行国外资产减少的情况，这是因为银行的客户以及海外主体直接持有了这部分资产，最简单的方式就是向境外汇出外币，而汇款过程也伴随着银行存款同步减少。

从人民币信贷收支表的情况来看，新增8096亿元贷款，本应创造等量存款，同时非银行金融机构存款减少7956亿，因此上述两项应该使住户、企业和政府存款增加近16000亿。但这些新增人民币存款被7238亿的金融机构外汇占款减少所抵销，即7238亿人民币存款转变为外币存款，因而住户、企业和政府存款新增9536亿。非银机构存款减少应该与股市资金流出有关，这一点市场应该是比较清楚的。

前面提到了央行注入了7435亿流动性，但中资七大行当月新增向央行借款508亿，而中资中小行借款684亿，总计仅1192亿，相差6100亿。这大概意味着央行的流动性支持主要针对七大行和中小行以外的银行。这种支持的一个因素，可能和外汇市场有关，比如说上述口径外的银行，可能由于某种原因购汇很多，使其在央行的人民币存款大幅减少，央行便提供了流动性支持，使得这些银行在央行的存款规模不致减少过剧。

国外资产和在央行的人民币存款，对于银行而言都是资产。央行出售国外资产，并投放人民币流动性，使得银行增持国外资产的同时，在央行的人民币存款大致不变。我们可以想象，央行的动作先发生，然后银行之间再一次互相交易国外资产，伴随着银行在央行人民币存款的相互转移。如果说前面向央行借款的数据，展现了央行的人民币流动性如何注入了银行体系，那么在央行的人民币存款的分布，一定程度上也反映了国外资产是如何以人民币存款的相反方向在银行之间流动的。七大行在央行的人民币存款新增3683亿，中小行新增1707亿，总计5390亿，高出央行资产负债表提到的新增177亿。这说明另外一些银行应该减持了在央行的人民币存款，而减持的原因，就可能包括了买入大中小行的国外资产。

影响银行在央行存款的格局的另一个因素和股市有关，8月大行存款减少5473亿元，主要受到非存款类金融机构存款减少8972亿影响，这意味着股市流出的存款并没有分配到各家大行，反而流到了中小行，使中小行境内存款增加8769亿，而存款的跨行转移，意味着银行在央行人民币存款的跨行转移。因此我们看到在8月份，大行在因存款流出而失去在央行存款的同时，又通过新增5000亿卖出回购，收回3200亿借出同业，收回买入返售1358亿，偿还同业借入1042亿等方式，努力从其它银行融入在央行的存款，不仅弥补了流失，可能还略有剩余。

而从大行和中小行的境外人民币存贷款来看，大行境外人民币存款减少319亿，境外人民币贷款增加19亿。而中小行境外存款减少667亿，境外人民币贷款竟然增加844亿。考虑到大行的来源运用总规模要大于中小行，可见中小行的境外人民币业务远超正常水平，在这一轮贬值行情中，中小行是境外主体资产外币化、负债人民币化的主要协助者。而8月底境外人民币贷款余额仅为3442亿元，因此8月份的增幅可谓显著。

从外币信贷收支表来看，我们看到外汇买卖减少了762亿美元，约合4876亿元人民币，意味着不仅是人民银行，境内商业银行在客户购汇的巨大规模面前，一方面找央行购汇（3184亿元外汇占款的减少），而另一方面也独自面对客户的购汇（约4876亿元人民币），两者加总已经大于金融机构外汇占款的减少幅度（7238亿）。但在境内外币贷款减少62亿美元，境内外外币总贷款减少20亿美元的情况下，储户在银行购汇后并没有形成等量的外汇存款，而是仅形成了270亿美元新增外汇存款（约合1726亿元人民币），小于金融机构外汇占款减少的7238亿。至于此差额是否全是跨境汇款，还需要等待外汇局的跨境汇款数据。

金融机构完全可以出现外汇占款余额为负值的情况，即银行放贷创造的人民币存款也被用于购汇。金融机构也可以出现自身持有的国外资产规模小于银行客户在银行的外汇存款规模的情况。外汇占款/外汇买卖的减少，只能说明银行将在央行的人民币存款变为外币存款，以及银行客户将在银行的人民币存款变为外币存款，后续的跨境汇款都是另外的操作。

总而言之，由于股市和汇市的震荡，8月份的信贷收支表和央行资产负债表数据充满了大幅波动以及需要进一步了解的交易，但总的情节仍然清楚，即央行出售自身持有的国外资产给银行，这些国外资产数量如此巨大，以至于央行需要给银行提供人民币流动性支持，使得银行能够从央行购买。而银行间的外汇买卖以及股市资金的流出，则造成了银行在央行人民币存款的再分配。

The eagerly anticipated August data for the central bank's balance sheet and credit statistics have finally been released. While the comprehensive overview of deposit-taking institutions and the balance sheet of other deposit-taking institutions were not simultaneously published, the existing information is already enough to draw close attention.

Starting with the central bank's foreign assets on its balance sheet, the data shows an August decrease of 854.5 billion yuan. Excluding the increase of 3.7 billion yuan in gold deposits, this comprises a reduction of 318.4 billion yuan in foreign exchange deposits and 539.8 billion yuan in "other foreign assets." The central bank explained that the decrease in foreign exchange deposits is less than the $93.9 billion (approximately 600 billion yuan) decline in China's foreign exchange reserves in August when converted based on exchange rates. In addition to providing foreign exchange liquidity, the central bank also experienced some fund withdrawals for entrusted loans related to foreign exchange reserves, and various major financial asset prices in international markets experienced different degrees of correction, which contributed to the inconsistent changes in foreign exchange deposits and foreign exchange reserves.

The reduction in "other foreign assets" is difficult to explain. This data has surged since July 2007, reaching 1.5 trillion yuan in June 2008, subsequently experiencing sporadic declines, stabilizing around 740 billion yuan since January 2013 after jumping from 407.7 billion yuan at the end of 2012. Changes in one asset could imply changes in another asset in reverse or changes in the same direction in liabilities/owner's equity. Therefore, the reduction in "other foreign assets" indicates an increase in other asset items or a decrease in liabilities/owner's equity.

While the central bank's claims on other deposit-taking institutions surged by 743.5 billion yuan in August, considering the central bank injected 210 billion yuan in liquidity through reverse repurchase agreements during the month, conducted a 6-day Standing Lending Facility (SLF) operation of 140 billion yuan from August 31, a 7-day SLF operation of 60 billion yuan from August 28, a 6-day SLF operation of 140 billion yuan from August 26, added 110 billion yuan in Medium-term Lending Facility (MLF), and 60.4 billion yuan in pledged supplementary lending (PSL), totaling liquidity injection reached 720.4 billion yuan, close to the scale of 743.5 billion yuan. Since these operations are domestic operations, not involving foreign assets, the reduction of 539.8 billion yuan in "other foreign assets" should not correspond to an increase in bank claims.

One viewpoint holds that these "other foreign assets" correspond to foreign currency deposits with the central bank. The rationale behind this perspective is that when banks hand foreign currency over to the central bank, there could be two states: holding RMB deposits through foreign exchange settlement and holding foreign currency deposits. Depending on the central bank's handling, the foreign currency received from banks could be classified differently; the former would be foreign exchange deposits, while the latter would be "other foreign deposits." The validity of this perspective is not clear from the current information. Regardless, this portion of "other foreign assets" should have left the central bank, and since there are no other significant potential increases on the central bank's asset side, this likely indicates that the central bank has reduced some liabilities.

Looking at the liability side of the central bank, we observe that other deposit-taking institutions' deposits with the central bank increased by only 17.7 billion yuan in August. This implies that if the central bank did not inject the aforementioned 743.5 billion yuan in liquidity, and banks did not receive an additional 247.6 billion yuan due to a decrease in fiscal deposits during the period, banks' deposits with the central bank would have decreased by nearly 990 billion yuan. This is due to banks directly increasing their holdings of the central bank's foreign assets by over 850 billion yuan, resulting in a decrease in their RMB deposits with the central bank. The scale of foreign assets held by banks can be confirmed through the balance sheet of other deposit-taking institutions, which will likely show that the increase in foreign assets held by banks is smaller than the decrease in foreign assets held by the central bank. This is because the customers of banks and foreign entities directly hold these assets, and the simplest way to transfer these assets is to send them abroad, which leads to a simultaneous decrease in bank deposits.

Analyzing the People's Bank of China's balance of payments, we see that new loans increased by 809.6 billion yuan, which should have created an equivalent amount of deposits. Meanwhile, deposits held by non-bank financial institutions decreased by 795.6 billion yuan. These two factors should have led to an increase of nearly 1.6 trillion yuan in household, corporate, and government deposits. However, this increase in RMB deposits is offset by the reduction of 723.8 billion yuan in financial institutions' foreign exchange deposits, meaning that 723.8 billion yuan in RMB deposits have been converted into foreign currency deposits. As a result, the net increase in RMB deposits is 953.6 billion yuan. The decrease in non-bank financial institutions' deposits is likely related to capital outflows from the stock market.

Furthermore, even though the central bank injected 743.5 billion yuan in liquidity, the seven major Chinese banks collectively borrowed only 50.8 billion yuan from the central bank, and mid-sized and smaller Chinese banks borrowed 68.4 billion yuan, totaling only 119.2 billion yuan. This suggests that the central bank's liquidity support was primarily aimed at banks other than the seven major and mid-sized banks. One factor behind this support could be related to the foreign exchange market. Some banks, outside the scope of the aforementioned banks, might have purchased a significant amount of foreign exchange for some reason, leading to a substantial decrease in their RMB deposits with the central bank. In response, the central bank provided liquidity support to ensure that these banks' deposits with the central bank did not decrease drastically.

Both foreign assets and RMB deposits with the central bank are assets for banks. The central bank sells foreign assets and injects RMB liquidity, allowing banks to increase their foreign assets while keeping their RMB deposits with the central bank roughly unchanged. It can be imagined that the central bank's actions occur first, followed by further interbank transactions of foreign assets, accompanied by the mutual transfer of RMB deposits with the central bank among banks. While the data on banks borrowing from the central bank shows how RMB liquidity was injected into the banking system, the distribution of RMB deposits with the central bank to a certain extent reflects how foreign assets flow among banks in the opposite direction. The seven major banks increased their RMB deposits with the central bank by 368.3 billion yuan, mid-sized and smaller banks increased theirs by 170.7 billion yuan, totaling 539 billion yuan, slightly exceeding the 177 billion yuan mentioned in the central bank's balance sheet. This indicates that other banks likely decreased their RMB deposits with the central bank. The reasons for this decrease might include their purchase of foreign assets from the seven major and mid-sized banks.

Another factor influencing the pattern of RMB deposits with the central bank is related to the stock market. Large banks' deposits decreased by 547.3 billion yuan in August, mainly influenced by the decrease of 897.2 billion yuan in non-deposit-type financial institutions' deposits. This indicates that the outflow of funds from the stock market did not spread evenly among the large banks but flowed instead to mid-sized and smaller banks, leading to a 876.9 billion yuan increase in domestic deposits for mid-sized and smaller banks. Such interbank transfers of deposits also imply the interbank transfer of RMB deposits with the central bank. Consequently, in August, while large banks lost deposits with the central bank due to outflows, they managed to mitigate the loss through various actions such as adding 500 billion yuan in reverse repurchase agreements, reclaiming 320 billion yuan lent out to other banks, reclaiming 135.8 billion yuan in securities repurchase agreements, and repaying 104.2 billion yuan borrowed from other banks, striving to maintain or slightly increase their deposits with the central bank.

Looking at overseas RMB deposits and loans for both large banks and mid-sized and smaller banks, large banks reduced their overseas RMB deposits by 31.9 billion yuan and increased their overseas RMB loans by 1.9 billion yuan. Surprisingly, mid-sized and smaller banks reduced their overseas deposits by 66.7 billion yuan while increasing their overseas RMB loans by 84.4 billion yuan. Considering that the source and use of large banks are generally larger than those of mid-sized and smaller banks, it is evident that the overseas RMB business of mid-sized and smaller banks far exceeded the normal level. In this round of depreciation, mid-sized and smaller banks played a major role in externalizing foreign assets and converting liabilities into RMB. By the end of August, the balance of overseas RMB loans was only 344.2 billion yuan, making the increase in August significant.

Looking at the foreign currency balance of payments, we observe a reduction of $76.2 billion in foreign exchange transactions, equivalent to about 487.6 billion yuan. This indicates that in the face of massive customer demand for foreign exchange purchases, both the People's Bank of China and domestic commercial banks independently faced the challenge. On one hand, they purchased foreign exchange from the central bank (resulting in a decrease of 318.4 billion yuan in foreign exchange deposits), and on the other hand, they handled customer demand for foreign exchange (approximately 487.6 billion yuan). Together, these two sums exceeded the reduction in financial institutions' foreign exchange deposits (723.8 billion yuan). However, despite the decrease of $6.2 billion in foreign currency loans and the $2 billion decrease in overseas and domestic foreign currency loans combined, depositors did not generate an equivalent amount of foreign currency deposits after purchasing foreign exchange from banks. Instead, they only formed an additional $27 billion in foreign currency deposits (approximately 172.6 billion yuan), less than the 723.8 billion yuan reduction in financial institutions' foreign exchange deposits. Whether this difference is solely due to cross-border remittances remains to be seen in the foreign exchange bureau's cross-border remittance data.

Financial institutions can certainly hold negative foreign exchange balances, where RMB deposits created by loans could be used for foreign exchange purchases. It's also possible for the scale of foreign assets held by financial institutions to be smaller than the scale of foreign exchange deposits held by banks' customers. The reduction in foreign exchange deposits/foreign exchange transactions can only indicate that banks have converted RMB deposits with the central bank into foreign currency deposits, and subsequent cross-border remittances are separate operations.

In summary, due to the fluctuations in both the stock and foreign exchange markets, the credit balance and balance sheet data for the central bank in August are characterized by significant volatility and transactions that require further understanding. Nonetheless, the overall narrative is clear: the central bank sold its substantial foreign assets to banks, with the quantity of these assets being so large that the central bank needed to provide RMB liquidity support to enable banks to purchase them. The interbank foreign exchange transactions and the outflow of funds from the stock market led to the redistribution of RMB deposits among banks.