2015-08-14 季天鹤央行观察

人们谈论国际收支时，常把各项都看作某种“资金”的来源和运用。例如经常项目顺差，意味着资金流入中国，而资本项目逆差则意味着资金流出。

黄金支付的情形下，一切都很好理解。贸易顺差，出口产品的黄金收入，大于进口产品的黄金支付，意味着黄金净流入。对外投资意味着黄金流出，外国来华投资意味着黄金流入。境外存款和境外贷款，意味着把黄金存放或者拆借给国外。而储备投资意味着把黄金由境内储存转向在境外运用，无论是存款还是贷款或者买入债券，都是黄金的流出。

黄金不流通了，可以参看银行业，银行存款成为货币，央行存款以纸币的形式流通也是货币。相应地，在国际收支当中，黄金不是收支“资金”之后，取代黄金拥有“资金”地位的，其实就是境外存款。历史上，即使是黄金通行全球的年代，跨国的头寸清算也占据着非常重要的位置，当时的人们甚至可以使用外国企业的付款承诺支付自己对外应付的货款。

现在人们依然习惯假想一个国际收支的“资金”，正如纸币渐渐不流行之后，人们还习惯认为银行存款意味着“资金”的来源，贷款意味着“资金”的运用，虽然事实上不过是纸币的来源和运用。然而，黄金没有了，纸币也用得没有过去多了，一个人和另外一个人之间的“资金”往来，早已由提取纸币、交接纸币、存入纸币的操作，变成存款转帐了。

银行客户跨境转帐对于银行意味着什么？在今天，银行收到的，显然不是千里迢迢运送过来的纸币。跨境付款，一方面体现为两个个体各自的银行存款此消彼长，同时也意味着境内银行在境外银行的同业存款增加，或者境外银行在境内银行的同业存款减少，甚至意味着两家银行在某国央行的头寸划拨，而在国际收支表上则表现为对外资产的增加或对外负债的减少。

特别要指出央行扮演的重要角色。工商银行如果在美联储开户，则花旗银行美国客户汇款给工商银行境内客户，就可以表现为工商银行在联储的存款增加，因而中国的境外资产增加。联储原有的部分国内负债变成了国外负债。同理，如果花旗银行在人民银行开户，则花旗银行美国客户汇款给工商银行境内客户，就表现为人民银行原有的国外负债减少，国内负债增加。关于离岸人民币的讨论已经详细描述了上述情景，见人行的《信用创造、货币供求与经济结构》。

在中国，央行和银行其实有一种“代持”外汇的关系。银行把银行客户转帐导致的外币头寸都甩给央行，自身以持有人民币准备金的方式持有央行债务。银行当然可以在央行持有外币存款头寸，事实上2007年人民银行要求部分银行将新增的法定准备金以外币形式存放，同时银行的客户外币存款还有5%的法定准备金率要求。但人民币升值的情形下，银行当然不愿意持有贬值资产导致账面损失，因此央行就承担了这些账面损失。

当银行需要对外转帐时，一方面其自身有一些境外存款，但银行也可以把在人行的外币存款转给境外，这一操作应该同时伴随着央行储备资产的减少。银行在央行的外币存款不是境外资产，而只是央行境外资产的转帐权利，正如储户的银行存款不是纸币本身一样。同时，银行也可以将在央行的人民币存款转变为自身在境外直接持有的资产，这种情况当然就是外汇局所称的“藏汇于民”。央行持有巨额外汇储备，既是央行执行汇率政策的权宜之计，也是银行不愿承受贬值损失的权宜之计。

跨境转帐的会计操作如何在国际收支中体现呢？境外汇来一笔款，只涉及了国际收支“其他资产”中资产或负债侧的“货币与存款”，而按照会计有借必有贷的规则，应该还有一项与转帐对应，这就是“变动原因”。人行与商业银行间的外汇买卖，使“储备资产”和“货币与存款资产”之间相互转化，原先由人行持有的境外资产转而由银行持有或相反。除此之外，两项目组成的境外资金头寸的变动，都是国际收支平衡表的其他项目的变动导致的。

如果没有人民币收付款，没有储备资产的变化，境外在境内没有存款，那么国际收支的每一项都应该反映在“其他投资-资产-货币与存款”上。出口、收到收益、收到转移支付意味着银行增持等额境外外币存款，而收款人在银行的外币存款增加。进口、付出收益、对外转移支付意味着银行减持等额境外外币存款，付款人在银行的外币存款减少。

特别地，外汇储备收益除了使外汇储备增加之外，还使得收支表上的“投资收益”部分增加，外汇局曾经就此问题多次解释过。而不涉及收付款的实物转移，在等值的情况下（易货贸易）只是贸易项目下进出口同时增加，而不等值的情况下会涉及转移支付或收益等，都不会对境外存款有影响。而如果出现了贸易中货物与货款流动的不同步，则会影响贸易信贷项目。

来华直接投资、证券投资、对华贷款等项目首先是一笔对中国汇款，收款人在银行存款增加的同时，中国境内银行的境外存款的增加。至于这笔汇款如何在银行结汇或者使用，都是境内银行负债如何变化的问题，和中国境外存款无关。只有重新发生对外付款的操作，才会影响中国境外存款，但这一操作也一定意味着国际收支的某个项目。而对外直接投资、对外证券投资、对外贷款等项目，则意味着中国境外资金头寸减少，以及上述项目的增加。

如果境外在境内有存款，则上述操作都多了一种可能，即境外在境内存款的变动，特别是在人民币国际化的情况下，更不容忽视。前面描述的各项对中国境外存款的影响，也可以用于影响境外个体在华存款。中国经常项目顺差表现为境外在华存款的减少，对华投资和贷款意味着境外在华存款减少，中国对外投资和贷款意味着境外在华存款增加。

在境外持有人民币存款和境外机构在华持有外币存款，都可以看作是境内机构在外用外币头寸购买人民币，以及境外机构在华用人民币购买外币的结果。对于境内机构的境外头寸和境外机构的在华头寸而言，最关键的是汇款，因为汇款才会产生上述的跨境头寸。境内机构在境内和境外机构在境外的操作，例如发放外汇贷款和结售汇等，无论是外币还是人民币，都不会反映在国际收支里。

所以2014年的国际收支平衡表可以从另外一个视角分析。储备资产增加1178亿美元，境外货币和存款资产增加1597亿美元，共计2775亿美元。经常项目带来了2197亿美元收款，净直接投资2087亿美元收款，净证券投资824亿美元收款。贸易信贷让中国少收到或者多付出709亿美元，误差和遗漏让中国少收到或者多付出1401亿美元，对外新增贷款和对外净还款让中国付出了738+343=1081亿美元。

境外在境内货币和存款增加814亿美元，也就是之前各种操作中，有一部分没有反映为境外头寸减少，而是反映为对外负债增加，即节省支付境外头寸814亿美元。剩下的“其他投资-其他资产和负债”和“资本项目”贡献了44亿美元。上述合计，当然就是中国对外净头寸的2775亿美元变化（=2197+2087+824-709-1401-1081+814+44）。数字都没有改变，改变的只是分析的角度。

而其中的误差与遗漏，从这一视角看，就是一种资金流和其流动原因不匹配的结果。国际收支有两种数据，一种是资金流本身，一种是项目而非资金流本身，如进出口。如果所有的进出口都按照实际收到和支付的货款来计，没收到钱的出口都不算出口，收到多少算多少，那么新口径下，进出口的变动就等同于资金头寸的变动，贸易信贷不复存在之外，误差与遗漏也会减少。

这种新记法当然有自己的问题，但应该看到，传统上那种认为经常项目顺差一定对应了资金的流入的假设也有问题。贸易信贷的存在就已经说明，贸易流和资金流不匹配，而除贸易信贷之外还有更多不匹配，而这些不匹配都被扔进了误差与遗漏里，但事实上造成不匹配的，恰恰是诸如贸易项目自己。

和误差与遗漏一样重要的波动因素，还有贸易信贷，对外贷款、对外还款、以及在华存款，而这些恰恰为很多分析所忽视，反而是外汇局每年都在分析。经常项目、直接投资和证券投资都只是境外资金头寸的部分变动原因，除了这些还有其他变动原因，而这些原因也各有影响因素，需要单独分析。把这些因素统一归结为热钱，恐怕不太合理。

最后的讨论是：出口商出口货物得到了境外存款，是不是给境外的一种融资呢？如何看待传统上认为的中国出口商品同时给美国融资的说法？在金本位时代，其实非常清楚。出口货物换回黄金，当然不存在融资。而如果不运回国，而是放在外国银行，则当然是一种融资，因为外国银行可以将黄金用于放贷和投资。

但现代，由于银行制度的缘故，上述的出口货物同时融资的说法，其实和把银行为储户发放存款利息看作是储户给银行提供融资如出一辙，但后者恐怕是很奇怪的。银行存款在现在就是货币本身了，持有银行存款已经不算是给银行融资了。银行自己想放贷给谁就能给谁创造出存款来，并不需要外国人卖出商品来提供。而且，银行放贷给贷款人，贷款人的银行存款增加，恐怕也不能算是贷款人给银行融资。不能仅因为存款是银行的债务，就说这是融资。

虽然把境外存款增加等同于融资恐怕有些勉强，但其他的操作，如在一级市场购买债券等，显然更符合融资的概念，因为外国融资人因此得到了可以运用的货币（银行存款）。但总的来说，融资是一个资金流动的动态过程，发出的债券只是融资的结果和认证，并非融资本身。中国有没有给外国人提供融资，恐怕还是要具体情况具体分析。

When people discuss international balance of payments, they often consider various items as sources and uses of certain "funds." For example, a surplus in the current account implies funds flowing into China, while a deficit in the capital account implies funds flowing out.

In the context of gold payments, everything is easily understood. A trade surplus, where the income from exporting products in gold exceeds the gold payments for imported products, signifies a net inflow of gold. Outbound investment implies gold outflow, while foreign investment in China implies gold inflow. Deposits and loans abroad indicate the placement or lending of gold to foreign countries. Reserve investment signifies the shifting of gold from domestic storage to overseas utilization, whether through deposits, loans, or bond purchases – all represent gold outflow.

When gold is no longer in circulation, one can draw parallels with the banking sector. Bank deposits become currency, and central bank deposits circulate as paper currency. Similarly, in the context of international balance of payments, after gold is no longer considered the "funds," it is replaced by foreign deposits. Historically, even during the era when gold was universally accepted, cross-border settlement played a significant role. People could even use foreign companies' payment commitments to settle their own payables.

In the present day, people still tend to imagine "funds" in the context of international balance of payments, just as with the declining use of paper currency, people still associate bank deposits with the source of "funds" and loans with the use of "funds," even though they are fundamentally sources and uses of paper currency. However, with the absence of gold and the reduced prominence of paper currency, the exchange of "funds" between individuals has evolved from handling physical currency to transferring deposits.

What does cross-border bank transfer mean for banks? Today, the bank does not actually receive physical banknotes sent from afar. Cross-border payments reflect not only the respective banks' changing deposit levels but also indicate a potential increase in interbank deposits abroad for domestic banks or a decrease in interbank deposits abroad for foreign banks. It might even indicate the shifting of positions within a central bank if both banks hold accounts with the same central bank. In international balance of payments terms, these actions correspond to changes in external assets or liabilities.

The central bank plays a crucial role in this dynamic. If a Chinese bank has an account with the Federal Reserve, and a US customer of Citibank makes a payment to a customer of the Chinese bank in China, it would reflect an increase in deposits held by the Chinese bank with the Federal Reserve, thereby increasing China's external assets. Similarly, if Citibank has an account with the People's Bank of China and a US customer makes a payment to a customer of the Chinese bank in China, it would lead to a decrease in the People's Bank of China's external liabilities and an increase in domestic liabilities. This relationship has been discussed in depth regarding offshore renminbi.

In China, there is a relationship of "proxy holding" of foreign exchange between the central bank and commercial banks. When banks transfer foreign exchange balances due to their customers, they effectively offload these to the central bank. The banks hold central bank liabilities in the form of required reserves in renminbi. While banks may hold foreign currency deposit positions with the central bank, it should be noted that in 2007, the People's Bank of China required some banks to hold newly increased statutory reserves in foreign currency deposits. Additionally, a 5% statutory reserve requirement applies to foreign currency deposits held by bank customers.

Regarding the cross-border transfer of funds, how does it manifest in the international balance of payments? A foreign currency payment entering China only involves the international balance of payments' "other assets" or "currency and deposits" on the asset or liability side. According to accounting principles, for every debit, there is an equivalent credit, and there should be a corresponding item for each transfer – this is the "change reason." Foreign exchange transactions between the central bank and commercial banks result in the conversion of "reserve assets" into "currency and deposits assets," or vice versa, as held by the central bank or banks. Other factors aside, the change in foreign exchange positions composed of these two items leads to the changes in the "other investment" and "capital account" sections of the international balance of payments.

If there were no renminbi receipts and payments, no changes in reserve assets, and no changes in foreign deposits within China, then every item in the international balance of payments would be reflected in "other investment – assets – currency and deposits." Exports, earnings received, and transfer receipts would lead to an increase in foreign currency deposits held by banks, while recipients' foreign currency deposits held in banks would increase. Imports, earnings paid, and transfer payments would lead to a decrease in foreign currency deposits held by banks, while the payer's foreign currency deposits in banks would decrease.

Particularly, the returns on foreign exchange reserves, besides increasing the foreign exchange reserves, also lead to an increase in the "investment income" portion of the balance of payments, an issue the foreign exchange authority has repeatedly explained. Non-physical transfers not involving receipts or payments reflect increased export and import volumes. In situations of unmatched goods and payment flow, transfer payments or earnings are involved, which would not affect foreign currency deposits. Should there be a mismatch between the flow of goods and payments, trade credits would be affected.

Direct investment in China, securities investment, and loans to China primarily involve remittances to China. While the recipient's bank deposits increase, the foreign bank's deposits with Chinese banks also increase. How these remittances are used or converted by Chinese banks into domestic liabilities is a separate matter from the increase in foreign deposits. Only when foreign payments are made does it affect foreign deposits, but this would also correspond to a specific item in the balance of payments. Direct investment in China, securities investment, loans to China, etc., lead to a decrease in foreign currency deposit positions abroad and an increase in these respective items.

If foreign deposits exist within China, these operations take on an additional dimension: changes in foreign deposits held within China, a factor especially relevant in the internationalization of the renminbi. The effects of China's current account surplus are reflected in the decrease of foreign deposits within China. Similarly, foreign investments and loans to China imply a decrease in foreign deposits within China, while China's foreign investment and loans lead to an increase in foreign deposits within China.

Foreign-held renminbi deposits and foreign institutions' foreign currency deposits within China can be seen as foreign entities purchasing renminbi with foreign currency positions and foreign entities purchasing foreign currency with renminbi, respectively. For domestic institutions' foreign positions and foreign institutions' positions in China, remittances are crucial, as remittances create cross-border positions. The operations between domestic institutions domestically and foreign institutions abroad, such as foreign exchange loans and settlements, whether in foreign currency or renminbi, do not impact the international balance of payments.

Hence, the 2014 international balance of payments can be analyzed from a different perspective. An increase in reserve assets of $117.8 billion, an increase in foreign currency and deposit assets of $159.7 billion, amounts to a total of $277.5 billion. Current account receipts contributed $219.7 billion, net direct investment $208.7 billion, and net securities investment $82.4 billion in receipts. Trade credits accounted for a decrease of $70.9 billion in receipts, errors and omissions led to a decrease of $140.1 billion in receipts, and new loans to foreign countries and net repayments led to an outflow of $73.8 + $34.3 = $108.1 billion.

An increase of foreign currency and deposit assets within China by $81.4 billion reflects instances where certain operations did not result in a reduction in foreign positions but instead increased foreign liabilities, indicating a saving in cross-border positions of $81.4 billion. The remaining changes in "other investment – other assets and liabilities" and "capital account" contributed $4.4 billion. The sum of these changes is indeed the $277.5 billion change in China's net external position (= $219.7 + $208.7 + $82.4 - $70.9 - $140.1 - $108.1 + $81.4 + $4.4). The figures have not changed; only the analytical perspective has changed.

Similar in importance to errors and omissions is the fluctuation factor of trade credits, foreign loans, repayments, and deposits within China, which is often overlooked in analysis but is reviewed annually by the foreign exchange authority. The current account, direct investment, and securities investment only partially account for changes in foreign currency deposit positions. In addition to these, there are other factors contributing to changes, each with its own influencing factors requiring individual analysis. Unifying these factors under "hot money" might be questionable.

Finally, the discussion turns to whether exporting businesses receiving foreign deposits are a form of financing for foreign entities. How should one interpret the traditional notion that Chinese exports simultaneously finance the United States? In the gold standard era, this was clear – exporting goods meant receiving gold in return, eliminating any notion of financing. If the goods were not returned to the country but held in foreign banks, then it could indeed be considered financing, as foreign banks could lend and invest with the gold.

However, in modern times, due to the banking system, the idea of exporting goods as simultaneous financing, in essence, parallels the concept of deposit interest paid to depositors being considered financing for banks. The modern bank deposit itself is already a form of currency, and holding bank deposits does not equate to financing the bank. Banks can create deposits to lend to whomever they choose, and this doesn't necessitate foreign entities selling goods to provide financing. Furthermore, when a bank lends to a borrower, the borrower's bank deposit increases, but this cannot be considered the borrower financing the bank simply because the deposit is a bank liability. The classification of this as financing might be questionable.

While equating the increase in foreign deposits to financing might be a bit strained, other operations, such as purchasing bonds in the primary market, align more closely with the concept of financing. Foreign financing parties receive usable currency (bank deposits), which implies financing. However, in general, financing is a dynamic process of fund flow, and the issuance of bonds is merely the outcome and validation of financing, not financing itself. Whether China has provided financing to foreign entities remains a case-specific analysis.