原创 2016-04-29 季天鹤央行观察

作者：季天鹤、方正中期期货利率汇率研究员、央行观察专栏作家

违约和庞氏骗局看似都是无法偿付，但其实有着不同的根源，而估值的变化则给这两者增加了新的维度和可能。

中信改革发展研究院的简练老师和我先后就读于北京大学经济学院。最近他于中信出版社出版了新著《资本的真相》，分享了他对中国制造业和互联网行业的深刻观察与思考，特别是对于货币金融与实体经济的交汇地带着墨甚多，对互联网时代的资本市场有着深刻的剖析。对我来说，由于我的视角会受到我研究的利率汇率市场局限，对实体经济关注不足，因此这本书给我在了解实体经济方面有很多助益。

其中一个有意思的细节引发了我的思考，也就是关于互联网公司如何在资本市场上获得了某种“融资特权”，即摆脱了传统上市盈率、市净率的估值体系，而另创了从用户数、点击率等方面估值的新体系。这种“融资特权”曾经在去年遭受了某些传统财务分析人士的抨击。互联网企业的上市和倒闭，到底有什么特别之处，这便是本文的出发点。

违约

最近信用债违约层出不穷，直接的原因在于资金入不敷出，在债券到期时没有足够的资金用于偿付本金，甚至在应付利息的时候没有足够的资金用于支付利息。但同时我们看到，除了依靠商品销售带来的利润以及相应的现金流偿还本息之外，还有一种偿付的方法是抛售资产，这也是少数企业的玩法之一，即看似是在以某种业务为名义融资，但事实上企业的目标是开发区的土地或者其他资产的升值。甚至有些企业可以专门靠低价买入资产，高价卖出资产来赚钱，其主营业务反而是噱头。

依靠收入过活的企业，其竞争力在于以有利润的价格卖出够多的产品，追求总利润的最大化，一般来说其资产的会计核算也都是传统的折旧模式，这被看作是比较“保守”的，其思路在于把资产变为每年折旧的费用，放到每年的利润核算当中去。在这样的会计世界里，没有资产升值这种赚钱方法的考虑。

而依靠资产过活的企业，其竞争力在于以有利润的价格卖出资产，追求资产升值中的利润最大化，一般来说其资产的会计核算会采取某种盯住市场价格的方法。与之相对，我们也可以看到石油企业在石油涨价期间囤积石油，即使没有卖出，也会被看作是获得了资本利得。更有甚者，会把未来的石油预期销售额计算成所谓现值，获得某种未来收入的现值增长利得。

如果把上面的情况总结一下，我们可以看出：把未来收入折现计算资产价值变动，和把现在的资产折到未来计算费用，可以看作是两种互为镜像的状态（读者或许已经发现，折旧忽略了钱的时间价值，因为其中不考虑折现率）。把资产拆分出售和把产品拆分出售是两种平行的模式，等待资产升值和等待产品升值也是两种平行模式。

此外，我们还看到两种不同的估值模式。在收入的模式下，只有卖出了货才能够计算收入和利润，而在估值的模式下，即使资产并没有被卖出，企业或者企业的投资者也把资产的市场价格作用于企业的资产上。这和股票市场的情况一样，即市场上少量交易的价格被同时作用于全部存货和资产。这里面存在着和金融市场一样的流动性假定，而这一假定其实是不现实的，在所有存货被同时卖出的时候，估值将剧烈下跌。此外，当估值降低的时候，会出现融资人的总资产总估值无法偿债的问题，因为债务的金额是刚性的。这时候要么债务展期，要么债务也要打折。

从投资人的角度讲，投资人需要考虑自己的出资到底是基于对方在挣已变现收入来进行的，还是基于对方是挣账面增值来进行的，是基于对方在靠卖产品进行的，还是基于对方靠抛售资产进行的。当然，违约本身的结果都是收不到钱，但我们看到了违约背后不同的逻辑，投资人本来是应该要求不同的风险溢价的。

更深层次的看，我们可以说违约指的是融资人的资产侧出了问题。企业在运用资产中产生的产品不能及时带来足够的收入流，卖出资产本身也无法及时带来足够的收入流，从而导致偿债困难。上面的“及时”很重要，比如尽管银行资产负债规模或许匹配很好，但借短贷长导致期限错配，会导致违约。收入流也未必是货币的，比如美发店发了美发卡，但因经营不善倒闭，欠下客户很多理发服务，也是违约。之所以强调资产侧，乃是因为下面一种违约是负债侧出了问题，也就是庞氏骗局。

庞氏骗局

和依靠资产侧挣钱或者挣不到钱而违约有所不同，庞氏骗局的挣钱和败露（和上面的违约有所区别）则是另一种思路，即靠扩大负债。投资者的本金与利息偿付，完全依靠有新的投资者进来。例如在e租宝的案件里，新投资者汇入的本金被用来支付企业的开支（比如令人瞠目的工资等），以及偿付原有投资者的本金和收入。e租宝自己的资产能够产生的收入很少，它自己的资产估值也并没有什么上升，完全可以忽略。

但考虑到前面提到的互联网企业，我们会发现，互联网企业很多时候资产产生的收入也很少，资产的估值也没有什么上升，新投资者汇入的本金被用来支付企业的开支（地推、补贴、请苍老师参加年会），以及偿付原有投资者的本金和收入（VC退出把股权卖给PE，PE退出把股权在IPO中卖给公众投资者）。当然，这种互联网行业和庞氏骗局类似的状况，和互联网行业自己的情况有关，并不意味着互联网行业真的是行业骗局。

除了互联网企业，另一个类似的状况居然是银行，在庞氏骗局这个术语出现之后，奥地利学派的货币银行学家们立刻把这个术语用在银行身上，当然这也是很有争议的。在古代，人们将金银币存入银行，银行承诺随时兑付。但银行不会把人们存入的金银币一直放在金库里，而是会再贷出去从而收取利息，因此一旦所有存款人挤提，银行会倒闭。

正常的情况下，银行应该很好地安排他的贷款到期情况，使得还款带来的金银币加上库存作为准备的金银币能够应对存款客户的提款要求。这种正常的情况和前面说的违约类似，即通过资产运用来获得收益。但是，银行很容易走入另一个模式里，即依靠新储户存入的金银币，来满足老储户的提款需求。

而进入了目前银行存款就是货币本身的时代，我们会发现银行支付的利息体现为银行负债侧储户存款的增加，同时伴随着银行所有者权益中待分配利润的减少；而银行收取利息则体现为作为融资人的储户存款减少，银行所者权益中待分配利润的增加。银行发放红利体现为股东在银行的存款增加，以及银行所有者权益部分待分配利润的下降；而银行收取红利体现为被投资企业在银行的存款减少，而银行的所有者权益部分待分配利润增加。无论何种情况，银行的总资产在两种情况下居然是不变的，资产侧没有任何增值，也没有任何新收入。

也就是说，在传统庞氏骗局里面，诈骗者的新负债乃是增加现金资产的来源，类似现金流的引水渠，用来偿付旧投资人的乃是某种资产。而在现在的银行业务里面，银行可以直接创造负债给老储户作为利息，负债本身不再是一个引水渠，而是本身可以用来偿付的。这里面的秘诀，在于传统庞氏骗局里，诈骗者和投资者都使用同样的资产用来投资和偿付，但对银行而言，银行的负债就是被投资者承认的资产，因此银行可以通过扩大负债的方式实现付息。这也是为什么银行业务会有非常强的监管、e租宝和财富管理公司等为何频频陷入庞氏骗局当中、支付宝等第三方支付企业被严令禁止余额沉淀，因为其业务模式确实存在特殊性。

正如违约有资产价格提高和实现收入两条路径来避免和引发一样，庞氏骗局也有两个途径。传统庞氏骗局和实现收入的方式类似，即将扩张新债务作为搭建引水渠来把新投资者的钱给旧投资者。但另一种庞氏骗局的方法则和资产价格提高类似，典型的方式就是老千股，高价发行股票，再把股价作低，然后低价回购，然后再炒高价发行圈钱，这样老股东总是在圈新股东的钱，再让新股东出局，但总股票数量完全可以是不变的。两者的中间地带大概是前面提到的互联网公司模式，同时有估值变化和数量扩张两种，当然，再次强调这并不意味着互联网公司就是庞氏骗局。

股灾

传统的违约是资产侧收入无法覆盖负债侧兑付要求，传统的庞氏骗局是负债侧新增负债带来的资产无法覆盖老负债侧兑付要求。在上述的传统情况下，本来是没有价格变动的因素的。而股灾则是和传统违约和传统庞氏骗局相对的，完全基于价格变动，使得违约和传统骗局都有了新特点。

前面提到了，违约除了收入的渠道外还有资产价格渠道。在股灾当中，我们看到了股权质押配资的影响。这种融资其实就是完全依靠股票价格上涨来偿还配资款，而完全没有关于股票分红方面的任何考虑，因此在股票下跌中也会遭遇强平，但由于前面提到的估值体系里面少量交易作用于全部估值的原因，上述强平反而促使了其他的强平，导致股价自由落体式的下跌。

股权质押融资相当于是估值变动的资产配对估值不变的负债，而少数互联网企业则意味着估值不变的资产配对估值变动的股票。前面提到，少数互联网企业的资产其实并不值钱，同时也没有很多收入，但股票价格变动很大。因此，上述企业可以在高股价的时候发行，将估值固化为现金后投资或生产。我们现在已经看到不少泡沫中发行股票融到资的企业在四处撒钱，因为实在是募集了太多的钱，而之所以太多乃是因为估值，而非业务需要。

企业也可以直接把自己的老股票或者新股票当前花，跳过募集资金这一步，换取各种资产或者生产。这在并购当中更为常见，在生产中并没有听说有用股票购买原材料的例子。股票并购相当于用高估值收购低估值企业，类似硬通货国家收购软通货国家资产。而且我们甚至可以推断，和直接用高估值股票收购相比，发行新股募集资金再购买反而会打压自己股票的价格而推升被收购方股票的价格，不如直接用高估值股票收购合算。

相比把股票当钱花，固化估值成现金则一般需要等待股灾的破灭。高估值购买低估值股票是发生在泡沫时，因为一旦泡沫破灭，高估值会被打回低估值，而低估值则相对稳定，差异就不明显。但如果在高估值的时候圈到钱，即使估值破灭，只要银行不倒闭，钱并不会化为乌有，反而可以在低估值企业估值更低的时候进行收购，或者收购从之前的高估值坠落成低估值的企业，乃至其他因泡沫破裂而跌价的资产。

同时，在高股价时募集资金，相当于将本来可以通过购买维持泡沫的资金给圈走，本身也会刺破泡沫，实现高估值固化后打压其它企业估值的效果。如果说借短贷长是收入渠道的魔术，那么固化高估值并刺破泡沫就是估值渠道的核武器。

小结

违约、庞氏骗局和股灾之间有着非常复杂的联系，其深层次的精妙之处，都在两个看似非常简单的概念里，也就是收入和价差里面。在经济学里，收入是实体经济投资的结果，算在GDP里，但估值和资产转手本身不计算GDP。在会计中，利息收入和资本利得在损益表里面分别计算和列示。在税收里，收入和价差被看作不同的科目而分别征税。在国际收支平衡表里，收入是经常项目的一部分，而价差会根据是否变现汇回而放在资本项目里。在债券定价中，应付利息是单独累积的，而价差变动是只考虑净价的，仿佛折现率的变化对未来的利息现金流不起作用一样。上述差异都说明，收入和估值价差是不同的，这种差异是非常深刻的。

而在货币分析中，收入被看作是货币本身，或者因对应了应收帐款而没有货币，而估值则是一个工具能够套到多少货币的指标，它本身并不是货币。因此，也会有我在《股灾与挤提：金融市场中的准备金结构》、《股市蒸发的4万亿为什么不是钱？》以及《救市前后的资金格局》中的一系列分析。估值更像是一个不断变化的提款比例，但被提款的一方有没有偿付的意愿和能力，则是需要考虑的，也就是人们常说的市场是否有流动性、是深还是薄了。以上便是简练老师的《资本的真相》一书给我的启示。

"Defaults, Ponzi Schemes, and Stock Market Crashes" may seem like unfulfillable obligations, but they actually have different roots, and changes in valuation add new dimensions and possibilities to these two.

The concise teacher from the China Institute of Reform and Development and I both studied at Peking University's School of Economics. Recently, he published a new book titled "The Truth of Capital" with China CITIC Press, sharing his profound observations and thoughts on China's manufacturing and internet industries. His book delves deeply into the intersection of monetary finance and the real economy, providing a thorough analysis of the capital market in the internet era. For me, as my perspective is constrained by my research in interest rates and exchange rates markets, my focus on the real economy is insufficient. Therefore, this book has provided me with significant insights into understanding the real economy.

One interesting detail triggered my thoughts, which is about how internet companies have gained a kind of "financing privilege" in the capital market. They have moved away from the traditional valuation system based on P/E ratios and P/B ratios, creating a new valuation system based on factors such as user numbers and click rates. This "financing privilege" was criticized by some traditional financial analysts last year. What is special about the listing and bankruptcy of internet companies? This is the starting point of this article.

Defaults:

Recently, defaults in corporate bonds have been increasing, and the direct reason is the lack of sufficient funds to cover expenses. When bonds mature, there isn't enough money to repay the principal, or even to pay the interest. But at the same time, we see that apart from relying on profits generated from commodity sales and the corresponding cash flow to repay principal and interest, another method of repayment is to sell assets. This is one of the tactics used by a few companies. It appears as if they are raising funds for certain business purposes, but in reality, their goal is the appreciation of land in development zones or other assets. Some companies even specialize in buying assets at low prices and selling them at high prices to make profits, with their main business being a sideshow.

Companies that rely on revenue for their livelihood compete by selling products at profitable prices and maximizing total profits. Typically, their asset accounting follows the traditional depreciation model, seen as relatively "conservative." The idea is to transform assets into annual depreciation expenses and include them in annual profit calculations. In this accounting world, there is no consideration for the method of making money through asset appreciation.

On the other hand, companies that rely on assets for their livelihood compete by selling assets at profitable prices, aiming to maximize profits from asset appreciation. Generally, their asset accounting involves tracking market prices. In contrast, we also see that during periods of rising oil prices, oil companies stockpile oil. Even if they don't sell it, this can still be seen as a capital gain. Moreover, some companies calculate their expected future oil sales as present value, gaining a kind of present value growth gain from future income.

To summarize the above situations, we can observe that calculating changes in asset value based on discounted future income and calculating expenses by discounting current assets to the future can be seen as two mutually mirrored states (readers may have noticed that depreciation ignores the time value of money, as it doesn't consider the discount rate). Splitting assets and products for sale are two parallel patterns, waiting for asset appreciation and waiting for product appreciation are also two parallel patterns.

Furthermore, we also see two different valuation models. In the revenue model, income and profit can only be calculated by selling goods, whereas in the valuation model, even if assets are not sold, the company or its investors apply the market price of the asset to the company's assets. This is similar to the stock market, where the prices of a small number of transactions are applied to all inventory and assets. This assumption involves the same liquidity assumption as the financial market, which is actually unrealistic. When all inventory is sold at the same time, the valuation will drop sharply. Additionally, when valuations decrease, there may be a problem of total asset valuation not covering debt for creditors since the amount of debt is rigid. In such cases, either the debt needs to be extended or the debt needs to be discounted.

From an investor's perspective, investors need to consider whether their investment is based on the counterparty earning realized income or book value appreciation, whether it's based on the counterparty selling products or selling assets. Of course, the result of default is not receiving money, but we see different logics behind defaults. Investors should demand different risk premiums for different situations.

Furthermore, we can say that default refers to problems on the financing side of the issuer. The products generated by the company's use of assets cannot bring sufficient income flows in a timely manner, and selling assets cannot bring timely income flows either. This leads to difficulty in debt repayment. The word "timely" is crucial here. For instance, while a bank's assets and liabilities might match well in scale, mismatching maturities, such as borrowing short and lending long, can lead to defaults. Income flows might not necessarily be monetary; for example, a hair salon that sells prepaid haircut cards might close down due to poor management, leaving many prepaid services unpaid – this is also a form of default. The emphasis on the asset side is because the other form of default arises from problems on the liability side, which is the Ponzi scheme.

Ponzi Schemes:

Unlike default arising from the inability to cover debt payments on the income side or asset side, Ponzi schemes have a different approach. They rely on expanding liabilities. The repayment of principal and interest to investors entirely depends on new investors entering the scheme. For instance, in the case of Ezubao, the capital invested by new investors was used to cover the company's expenses (including astonishingly high salaries), as well as to repay the principal and returns to existing investors. Ezubao's own assets generated very little income, and its asset valuation did not appreciate much, making it negligible.

However, when we consider the aforementioned internet companies, we find that often these companies also generate little income from their assets, and their asset valuation doesn't show significant appreciation. The capital invested by new investors is used to cover the company's expenses (such as local promotions, subsidies, inviting celebrities for annual meetings) and to repay the principal and returns to existing investors (VCs exit by selling shares to PEs, PEs exit by selling shares to the public in an IPO). Of course, the similarity between this situation in the internet industry and a Ponzi scheme doesn't mean that the entire internet industry is a scam.

Apart from internet companies, another similar situation surprisingly exists in the banking sector. After the term "Ponzi scheme" appeared, economists from the Austrian School of monetary and banking studies immediately applied this term to banks. Of course, this is quite controversial. In ancient times, people would deposit gold and silver coins in banks, and banks promised to redeem them at any time. However, banks wouldn't keep the gold and silver coins deposited by people in their vaults all the time. Instead, they would lend them out to earn interest. Therefore, once all depositors rushed to withdraw their funds, the bank would go bankrupt.

Under normal circumstances, banks should carefully arrange the maturity of their loans so that the gold and silver coins brought in through repayments, along with the coins held in reserve, could meet the withdrawal requests of depositors. This normal scenario, much like the default mentioned earlier, involves generating income through asset utilization. However, banks can easily fall into another pattern, which involves using the gold and silver coins deposited by new depositors to meet the withdrawal requests of old depositors.

As we enter an era where bank deposits themselves are money, we find that the interest paid by banks is reflected in the increase in deposit liabilities on the balance sheet, along with a decrease in the undistributed profits in the equity of bank owners. The interest received by the bank is reflected in the decrease of deposit liabilities on the lender's side and the increase in the undistributed profits in the equity of the bank's owners. Bank dividends reflect an increase in the deposits of shareholders in the bank and a decrease in the undistributed profits of the bank's owners' equity. When dividends are collected by invested companies, it's reflected in a decrease in the deposits of those invested companies at the bank and an increase in the undistributed profits of the bank's owners' equity. Regardless of the situation, the total assets of the bank remain the same in both cases; there's no change in the value of the assets, nor is there any new income.

In other words, in a traditional Ponzi scheme, the new debt taken on by the fraudster is the source of new cash assets, much like a water conduit, used to repay the old investors. However, considering the previously mentioned internet enterprises, we find that these enterprises often generate very little income from their assets, and their asset valuation doesn't show significant appreciation. The capital invested by new investors is used to cover the company's expenses (such as ground promotion, subsidies, inviting famous teachers to attend annual meetings) and to repay the principal and returns to existing investors (VCs exit by selling shares to PEs, PEs exit by selling shares to the public in an IPO). Of course, this similarity between the internet industry and a Ponzi scheme doesn't mean that the entire internet industry is really a scam.

Stock Market Crashes:

Traditional defaults occur when income channels cannot cover the liability-side payment obligations, and traditional Ponzi schemes occur when the creation of new liabilities leads to assets that cannot cover old liability-side payment obligations. In the traditional scenarios mentioned above, there are no factors related to price changes. In a stock market crash, we see the impact of equity pledge financing. This financing method relies entirely on rising stock prices to repay pledged capital, without any consideration for stock dividends. Therefore, in a falling stock market, forced liquidation can occur due to a drop in stock prices. But because of the valuation system mentioned earlier, where a small number of transactions affect the entire valuation, this forced liquidation actually triggers other forced liquidations, leading to a rapid decline in stock prices.

Equity pledge financing is equivalent to a paired valuation where asset valuation does not change and liability increases. Some internet companies are like this, as their assets aren't very valuable, but their stock prices fluctuate greatly. Therefore, these companies can issue stock during times of high stock prices, effectively crystallizing their valuation into cash for investment or production. We have seen a number of bubble-era companies that raised funds through stock issuance and are now giving away money because they raised too much, due to overvaluation, not business needs.

Companies can also directly spend their old or newly issued stock. This is more common in mergers and acquisitions, and there haven't been any examples of companies using stock to purchase raw materials in production. Stock-based acquisitions are like using high-valuation currency to acquire assets in countries with undervalued currency, akin to a hard currency country acquiring assets in a soft currency country. We can even deduce that compared to raising funds by issuing new stock and then making purchases, it's more efficient to directly use high-valuation stock for acquisitions, which could depress the price of one's own stock and elevate the price of the stock being acquired, whereas the total stock quantity can remain unchanged. In between these two approaches, there's the model of internet companies mentioned earlier that involves both changes in valuation and quantity expansion. However, I must emphasize again that this does not mean that the internet industry is a Ponzi scheme.

Stock market crash

Traditional defaults occur when the income from assets is unable to cover the liability-side payment requirements, and traditional Ponzi schemes involve adding new liabilities on the liability side that the assets cannot cover the old liability-side payment requirements. In the aforementioned traditional scenarios, there were originally no factors related to price changes. However, stock market crashes are in contrast to traditional defaults and Ponzi schemes, entirely based on price fluctuations, giving defaults and traditional schemes new characteristics.

As mentioned earlier, defaults not only have income channels but also asset price channels. In the context of a stock market crash, we can observe the impact of stock collateralized financing. This type of financing relies entirely on the increase in stock prices to repay the financing amount, without any consideration for stock dividends. As a result, it can face forced liquidation during a stock market downturn. However, due to the influence of the valuation system mentioned earlier, where a small amount of trading affects the overall valuation, these forced liquidations actually trigger other forced liquidations, resulting in a free-fall of stock prices.

Stock collateralized financing is essentially pairing assets with changing valuations with liabilities that have fixed valuations, whereas a few internet companies imply pairing assets with fixed valuations with stocks that have changing valuations. As mentioned earlier, the assets of a few internet companies are not actually valuable, and they also lack significant income, but their stock prices exhibit significant fluctuations. Therefore, these companies can issue stocks at high prices, solidify their valuations into cash, and then invest or produce. We have already witnessed many companies issuing stocks for financing during bubbles, distributing funds widely. This excess is not due to business needs but rather attributed to valuations.

Companies can also directly use their old or newly issued stocks for various assets or production, bypassing the step of raising funds through stock issuance. This is more common in mergers and acquisitions; in the production sector, there have been no instances of using stocks to purchase raw materials. Stock-based acquisitions are akin to acquiring undervalued companies with overvalued stocks, similar to a hard currency country acquiring assets in a soft currency country. Furthermore, we can even infer that issuing new stocks to raise funds for subsequent acquisitions might suppress the price of the company's own stocks and elevate the price of the stocks of the acquired entity, making direct acquisition with high-valuation stocks more advantageous.

In comparison to treating stocks as money, solidifying valuations into cash generally requires waiting for the collapse of the stock market. Purchasing undervalued stocks with high valuations occurs during bubbles, because once the bubble bursts, high valuations are reduced to low valuations, whereas low valuations remain relatively stable, resulting in less distinction. However, if funds are raised during times of high valuations, even if valuations collapse, as long as banks don't fail, the funds won't become worthless. On the contrary, they can be used for acquisitions when valuations of undervalued companies are even lower, or to acquire companies that have fallen from high to low valuations, and even other assets that have depreciated due to bubble bursts.

Simultaneously, raising funds during high stock prices essentially siphons off funds that could have been used to maintain the bubble. This act itself punctures the bubble and, after solidifying high valuations, suppresses the valuations of other companies. If borrowing short and lending long is the magic of income channels, then solidifying high valuations and bursting the bubble is the nuclear weapon of valuation channels.

Summary

There are intricate connections between defaults, Ponzi schemes, and stock market crashes. The profound intricacies lie within two seemingly simple concepts: income and valuation differentials. In economics, income is the result of real economic investment and is included in GDP calculations, but valuations and asset transfers themselves are not considered in GDP. In accounting, interest income and capital gains are calculated and presented separately in income statements. In taxation, income and valuation differentials are treated as distinct categories and are taxed accordingly. In international balance of payments, income is part of the current account, while valuation differentials are placed in the capital account based on whether they are repatriated as foreign exchange. In bond pricing, accrued interest is accumulated separately, while valuation differential changes only consider net prices, as if changes in discount rates do not affect future interest cash flows. These differences demonstrate that income and valuation differentials are distinct, and this distinction is profound.

In monetary analysis, income is viewed as currency itself or as non-monetary assets due to corresponding accounts receivable, while valuation is an indicator of how much currency a tool can capture. Valuation itself is not currency. Therefore, there is a series of analyses in my works such as "股灾与挤提：金融市场中的准备金结构" (Stock Market Crash and Squeezing: Reserves Structure in Financial Markets), "股市蒸发的4万亿为什么不是钱？" (Why Isn't the Vanishing 4 Trillion in the Stock Market Money?), and "救市前后的资金格局" (Funds Pattern Before and After Market Rescue). Valuation is more like a constantly changing withdrawal ratio, but the willingness and ability of the withdrawing party to make payment need to be considered. This is what people often refer to as whether the market has liquidity and whether it is deep or shallow. The above is the insight I gained from the book "The Truth of Capital" by Jian Lian.