原创 2016-03-09 季天鹤央行观察

外汇储备属于谁？这个问题十几年来众说纷纭，基本上有“属于央行”，“属于国家”，“属于人民”，“属于投资外商”几种观点。按说一笔钱属于谁这一问题应该只有一个答案，但为什么这里会有这样多的观点呢？答案需要我们在银行理论的深层寻找。

拥有与存管（保管、托管）的差异

首先我们考虑，银行ATM机里面的钞票是谁的？这个问题看似很好回答：银行的，抢银行是违法行为，会被判刑。但如果我们考虑另一个问题，即银行保险箱里的字画是谁的？大家又会很明确地表示是客户的。之所以产生上面回答的差别，乃是因为ATM机里的钞票为银行所拥有，而保险柜里的字画则是为银行所保管。

在金融思想史上，上述区别乃是奥地利学派银行理论的一个基本论题，即客户在银行存放黄金这一操作，是把黄金借给了银行，还是像存放字画那样让银行保管？换言之，银行资产侧的黄金是银行的还是客户的？又换言之，银行与客户的关系：银行是拥有现金还是替客户保管现金？银行是客户的债务人还是保管者？我们需要考虑三种关系：借贷关系，规则存管关系和不规则存管关系。

借贷关系是非常清楚的：我借给同学100元钱，1个月后归还，那么在这1个月期间，同学把钱拿去做什么和我无关，如果没有事先的约定提前兑付权利，我也无权提前找同学要回，而同学没有权利提前还款。任何更改条款都需要协商和双方同意，说不定还要支付对价，因为这些更改并没有反映在最开始的条款里，也自然没有包含在利率的定价里面。

第二种关系也很清楚，即所谓规则存管关系，指的是前面字画的例子。我把我的一幅字存放在银行，并给银行支付存管费用。银行把我的字放在一个恒温恒湿的保险箱里，条件很好，我很放心。我可以有随时要求取回我的字的权利，也可以随时查看我的字画是否还完好无损，而银行也随时需要满足我的要求，而且未经我的允许银行连开箱都不能进行。

第三种关系则是非常常见但非常“特殊”的一种关系，被称作不规则存管关系。比如我是一个农场主，收了麦子，但我自己没有存放的条件，就拿去存放在村里公共的一个大谷仓里。但我存放的时候并没有把我的麦子放在一个单独的空间里，而是和其他人的麦子混在一起。谷仓管理者对我承诺，在我要求取走麦子的时候给我等重量的麦子。但显然，他给我的麦子已经不是我最初存放的麦子了。如果是规则存管关系，我取出的麦子应该是我存进去的那些麦子，重量相等并不意味着是同一个东西。

在这种不规则存管关系中，谷仓管理者到底处于一个什么角色呢？由于他没有归还我当初存放的麦子的责任，他其实可以把别人存入的麦子给我，我也无从发现。他没有保管我那一份麦子的责任，而只是有兑付我等量麦子的责任，而这就给他留下了把我的麦子吃掉的可能性。而我也不会发现，因为管理者用别人的麦子毕竟满足我的兑付要求。

只要不是所有人同时来取麦子，谷仓管理者偷吃我的麦子的事实就不会被揭穿。管理者甚至可以利用我存入的麦子当作种子播种，过了一年之后自己收获了更多的麦子，一部分回存回谷仓来应对我可能的兑付要求，另一部分可以自己吃。这样的话，他不但可以满足我的兑付要求，而且还未经我同意利用我的麦子给自己弄了好处。

上述内容就是奥地利学派的《货币、银行信贷与经济周期》一书认为的银行存款业务存在的“欺诈”。作者德索托认为，储户认为把黄金存入银行是一种存管，如同股民把钱在第三方存管模式下给证券公司一样，但银行偷偷把储户的钱用来放贷，把存管关系擅自改成了借贷关系，还用给储户利息这种方式把借贷关系作实。

这种观点当然是值得商榷的，因为如果储户自己也觉得自己和银行间是一种借贷关系的话，那就不存在“擅自改动”的问题了，大家就是借贷。现在，人们已经很清楚银行存款是银行的表内债务，而不是像字画一样是资产负债表以外的存管，银行的财务报表上面也写得很清楚。但不得不说，银行存款这种债务是非常非常特殊的。

这种区别不在于债务形成后的情况：我们总可以把取款处理成某种“自动续期的隔秒拆借”业务。但问题在于存款这种债务的产生。银行的隔夜拆借业务或者融资票据/债券业务都是融资银行自己发起的。而存款业务这种让银行负债的操作，居然是债权人硬塞给银行的：我把我的黄金给银行，从现在起银行就欠我钱了。存款这种债务的起源，恐怕还真是有存管的古老基因。

外汇储备的来源和状态

外汇储备的来源用美元纸币来描绘会非常清楚。出口商出口了货物得到美元纸币后，把美元纸币存入银行。于是，出口商在银行有了美元存款，银行手里有了美元纸币。这和储户存入人民币纸币的时候，银行拥有了纸币而储户拥有了存款是一样的。而如果银行把美元纸币存入人民银行，那么人民银行手里就有了美元纸币，这部分美元纸币，就是外汇储备。同时，银行在人民银行也有了美元存款。当然，银行和储户都可以把美元存款结汇为人币存款。

对于储户来说，如果已经持有了人民币银行存款，那就不可能同时持有存款对应的人民币纸币，更不要说银行持有的美元纸币了。即使储户持有的是美元存款，银行手里的美元纸币也还是银行的，储户要么持有美元存款，要么持有美元纸币而失去美元存款，两者不可兼得。而持有美元存款和持有人民币存款的差别是，持有美元存款有权以1：1取出美元纸币，但持有人民币存款时，首先有一个转变为美元存款的过程，然后才是进入“有权以1：1取出美元纸币”的状态。

而人民币存款转变为美元存款则在数量和价格上同时面临不确定性。央行的外汇管制措施，使得人民币存款不能无限量变为美元存款（例如5万美元的个人结售汇限制），而外汇市场的波动、中间价的设定、央行的干预等，也使得人民币存款转变为美元存款的比率时时变化，本身并不确定。所以持有人民币存款的储户们，离他们存入的美元纸币，关系就更遥远了。

更不要说外汇储备乃是银行与央行存入外币和结售汇操作的结果，在外汇储备的行程中完全没有非银行主体任何事情。央行如果不愿意卖出他手中的美元纸币，银行就要只身面对储户对美元纸币的提取。或许有人会认为央行必须卖出自己手中的美元纸币，那么即使假定如此，这个价格也是完全不确定的，因为央行并没有承诺任何固定的汇率。央行可以以非常夸张的价格报价。

当非银行主体把美元纸币存入银行的那一刻起，美元纸币就已经是为银行所拥有，非银行主体让出美元纸币拥有权，并获得美元存款的拥有权，且承担银行可能挤提倒闭的风险，而这种风险的补偿涵盖在客户存款的利息里。而当非银行主体把美元存款变为人民币存款之后，美元的种种变化都由银行承担，非银行主体持有的就是人民币，而不是任何直接或间接的对美元的持有。

所以人民币储户和外汇储备其实非常遥远，中间隔了央行的资产负债表，以及银行的资产负债表。外商在投资时的确把美元弄到了中国，但只要存在了银行，他们就要面临取不出来的问题；只要换成了人民币，就要面临汇率的问题。这和出口商得到美元后存入银行面临的问题完全一样。一旦成为人民币储户，他们就和银行放贷产生的人民币储户没有任何区别了。

认为“投资的外商是潜在的外汇储备拥有者”的人士，其观点的根源，在于认为外商是让银行保管外汇。保管外汇的假设下，银行和央行保管的外汇都不在其资产负债表上，而是直接在其拥有者的资产侧。但事实上银行当然不这么认为，外商自己恐怕也不这么认为。保管是要交保管费的，外商们好像并没有交，而且如果是保管关系，外商就无法结汇了，因为保管的既然是美元，银行怎么会让外商拥有人民币存款呢？

至于认为国家拥有外汇储备、人民拥有外汇储备等观点，则和银行理论关系不大，而和债权股权和资产的关系有关。比如说上市公司的股东能否因为自己是股东就把公司的椅子拿回自己家？人民能不能打砸抢国企办公楼？恐怕都不行。拥有一家公司的股权或债权，和拥有这家公司自己的资产，还不完全一样。这也是为什么资产负债表被分成两边，因为中间那道分隔是非常关键的。认为外汇储备属于出口商的出口商们，或许先要考虑，自己公司的机器设备能否被债务人和股东说取走就取走。所以外汇储备属于央行，是央行的资产，是毫无疑问的。

意外的小结

外汇储备属于谁这一问题，其实和银行纸币属于谁、银行大楼属于谁等都是同一个问题。出口商们和外国投资者一旦把外汇存入银行，这外汇就不再属于他，他拥有的就只是境内银行的外汇存款了。即使他有权汇出外汇，这一操作同时作用于银行持有的外汇和他在银行的境内外汇存款，这也不等同于他直接替银行操作了银行资产侧持有的外汇。

如果外国投资者和出口商不汇入外币，而是直接在境外持有外币，那么外汇储备当然就不会有增长，也就不会有外汇储备属于谁的争议：人民银行持有他的外汇储备，外国投资者和出口商持有他们的外币。但一旦外国投资者和出口商进行汇入和结汇的操作，银行把外汇资产给央行，那么央行持有的外汇储备增加，外国投资者和出口商也失去了外币。

为什么外国投资者和出口商非要结汇呢？原因乃是一个非常微观和草根的因素：他们的付款对象在境外没有存款帐户。只要工人们、政府、供货商们在海外没有存款帐户，外国投资者和出口商就总是需要把外汇汇入国内银行再结汇，用人民币支付给工人们工资、给政府缴税、给供货商们货款、乃至自己给自己买房等。

在近代中国没有结汇这件事情。外国硬币到了中国就开始直接流通，华夏大地上同时交易着多种多样的外国银币。而在现在，随着各种支付方式的发展、人员流动的增加，在伦敦吃饭用支付宝扫码结账已经不是天方夜谭，而这笔餐费恐怕是在支付宝的两个帐户间流动，和英国不发生任何关系，支付宝份额成了英国人民的“大洋”。

反之，如果中国越来越多的人都在美国有存款帐户，都使用连接美国帐户的Apple Pay支付，那么外商投资也就不需要结汇了，直接用美元发工资就OK了。这里的美元不是境内美元存款，而是真真正正的美元（在美国的美元存款）。而我们也从前面的银行理论深层问题，意外地触及了货币理论的深层问题。我们或许会发现，支持人民币使用的就剩下财政部要求用人民币缴税了。

不过在这一天到来之前，发愁的说不定会是其他国家，因为中国有全球最强的移动支付技术和实践经验。如果中国向全世界输出了移动支付的能力，让世界各国人民通过刷脸在中国的银行开户，让世界各国人民都直接使用支付宝或者微信余额支付，让世界各国人民都通过余额宝这样的货币基金进行融资。这样一来，不少国家的央行和银行就都要成为摆设了。

Who Owns Foreign Exchange Reserves? This question has been debated for over a decade, with various viewpoints including "owned by the central bank," "owned by the country," "owned by the people," and "owned by foreign investors." While the question of who owns a sum of money should logically have a single answer, why are there so many different perspectives here? The answer lies in delving deep into banking theory.

Differences between Ownership and Custodianship: Let's begin by considering whose money is inside an ATM owned by a bank. The answer might seem straightforward: it belongs to the bank, and robbing a bank is illegal and punishable. However, let's ponder a different question: whose ownership does the artwork in the bank's vault belong to? People would likely state that it belongs to the customer. The distinction in these answers arises from the fact that the cash inside the ATM is owned by the bank, while the artwork in the vault is being held in custody by the bank. In the history of financial thought, this difference forms a fundamental question in the Austrian school of banking theory. Is a customer lending their gold to the bank when they store it, or is it akin to entrusting the bank to safeguard their gold, similar to the storage of artwork? In essence, is the bank's possession of gold on its asset side actually the bank's, or does it belong to the customer?

Three Types of Relationships: This question raises three types of relationships: a borrowing-lending relationship, a regulated custody relationship, and an irregular custody relationship. The borrowing-lending relationship is clear-cut: If I lend $100 to a friend and they return it in a month, during that month, my friend's use of the money is none of my concern. Similarly, I cannot demand early repayment unless stipulated, nor can my friend repay early without my permission. Altering terms would require negotiation and mutual consent, potentially involving additional compensation, as these changes were not initially included in the terms or the pricing of interest.

The second type, regulated custody, refers to the artwork example mentioned earlier. I store my painting in a bank's vault and pay a custody fee. The bank ensures favorable conditions for my artwork in a controlled environment, and I have the right to demand the return of my painting at any time. The bank must fulfill my requests and cannot access the vault without my permission.

The third type, irregular custody, is both common and "peculiar." For instance, as a farmer, I collect wheat but lack storage facilities. I store my wheat in a communal barn, but it isn't separated from other people's wheat. The barn manager commits to providing me with wheat of equal weight when I request it, but the wheat I receive might not be the same as the wheat I initially stored. In such a scenario, what role does the barn manager play? Since they are not obligated to return my deposited wheat, they can give me someone else's wheat, and I might never find out. This leaves room for the possibility of the barn manager consuming my wheat since their responsibility is to provide me with wheat of equivalent weight, not necessarily the same wheat.

Profound Theories in Banking: These distinctions in banking relationships are the foundation of the Austrian school's view on banking, specifically the book "Money, Bank Credit, and Economic Cycles" by Jesús Huerta de Soto. The book claims that depositors entrust their gold to banks under the assumption of regulated custody, similar to how investors entrust securities to brokers. However, banks surreptitiously lend out the deposited money, changing the relationship from custody to lending. They even provide interest to depositors to substantiate this lending relationship. This perspective, while debatable, hinges on whether depositors themselves perceive their relationship with banks as borrowing and lending.

Modern Understanding: Modern understanding recognizes that bank deposits are bank liabilities within their balance sheet, not akin to artwork stored off-balance sheet. Financial statements are explicit about this. Bank deposits are, however, remarkably unique liabilities. The distinction doesn't stem from post-debt formation situations; one can frame withdrawals as a form of "automated overnight repurchase agreement" business. The unique aspect lies in the formation of deposit liabilities. Overnight repurchase or financing note transactions are initiated by the financing bank itself. In contrast, deposit liabilities are imposed on the bank by creditors: if I give my gold to a bank, the bank owes me money from that moment onwards. This ancestry of deposit liabilities likely stems from ancient custodial practices.

Source and State of Foreign Exchange Reserves: Describing the source of foreign exchange reserves with US dollar bills makes things clearer. When an exporter receives US dollar bills after exporting goods, and then deposits those US dollar bills into a bank, the exporter has US dollar deposits with the bank. Just like when a depositor deposits Chinese yuan bills and obtains bank deposits, the difference is that the bank holds US dollar bills in this case. If the bank then deposits the US dollar bills with the central bank, the central bank now has US dollar bills. These US dollar bills constitute foreign exchange reserves. Meanwhile, the bank also has US dollar deposits with the central bank. However, both the bank and the depositor can convert their US dollar deposits into Chinese yuan deposits.

For depositors, if they already hold Chinese yuan deposits with banks, they cannot simultaneously possess Chinese yuan bills, let alone US dollar bills held by the bank. Even if depositors hold US dollar deposits, the US dollar bills remain the bank's property. Depositors either hold US dollar deposits or US dollar bills, losing the US dollar deposits in the latter case. Holding US dollar deposits provides the right to withdraw US dollar bills at a 1:1 ratio. However, the conversion of Chinese yuan deposits to US dollar deposits involves uncertainty in both quantity and price due to central bank exchange controls and exchange market fluctuations.

In essence, once non-bank entities deposit US dollar bills with a bank, the US dollar bills become the bank's property. The non-bank entities relinquish ownership of the US dollar bills and gain ownership of US dollar deposits. They also assume the risk of bank runs, with compensation for this risk factored into deposit interest rates. Once these non-bank entities convert their US dollar deposits into Chinese yuan deposits, any changes in the US dollar's value become the bank's responsibility. Non-bank entities then hold Chinese yuan, not direct or indirect ownership of US dollars. The journey of foreign exchange reserves results from the actions of banks and the central bank in handling foreign currency and exchange transactions, without any involvement of non-bank entities.

Therefore, the relationship between Chinese yuan depositors and foreign exchange reserves is distant. It is separated by the central bank's balance sheet and the bank's balance sheet. While foreign investors do indeed bring US dollars into China through their investments, as long as these funds are within the banking system, they face difficulties in withdrawing them. Similarly, once converted to Chinese yuan, they are subject to exchange rate fluctuations. This is exactly the same challenge that exporters face when they receive US dollars and deposit them in banks. Once they become Chinese yuan depositors, their position is indistinguishable from domestic Chinese yuan depositors created through bank lending.

The assertion that "foreign investors who invest in the country are potential owners of foreign exchange reserves" originates from the notion that foreign investors let banks hold their foreign currency. Under the assumption of custodianship, foreign exchange held by banks and central banks does not appear on their balance sheets but is directly on the asset side of their owners. However, in reality, neither banks nor foreign investors seem to agree with this viewpoint. Custodianship involves custody fees, which foreign investors seem not to pay. Moreover, if a custodianship relationship exists, foreign investors cannot exchange foreign currency for Chinese yuan, as the custody concerns US dollars. In this scenario, why would banks allow foreign investors to hold Chinese yuan deposits?

Regarding the viewpoint that foreign exchange reserves belong to the country or the people, this is more related to the relationship between creditors' and shareholders' rights and assets than to banking theory. For instance, can shareholders of a publicly traded company take the company's chairs home just because they are shareholders? Can the public damage or seize state-owned enterprise offices? Likely not. Owning equity or debt in a company is not the same as owning the company's physical assets. This is why balance sheets are divided into two sides, as the dividing line is crucial. Those who believe that foreign exchange reserves belong to exporters may first need to consider whether their company's machinery and equipment can be taken by creditors or shareholders. Hence, it is unquestionable that foreign exchange reserves belong to the central bank; they are assets of the central bank.

Unexpected Conclusions: The question of who owns foreign exchange reserves is fundamentally the same as asking who owns banknotes or bank buildings. Once exporters and foreign investors deposit foreign exchange into banks, the foreign exchange ceases to be theirs; what they possess are merely domestic bank deposits in foreign exchange. Even if they have the right to exchange foreign exchange, this action affects both the foreign exchange held by banks and their foreign exchange deposits in banks, yet it is not equivalent to directly managing the bank's assets. If foreign investors and exporters do not convert foreign currency but directly hold it abroad, foreign exchange reserves will not grow, and there will be no debate about the ownership of foreign exchange reserves: the central bank holds reserves, while foreign investors and exporters hold foreign currency.

Why do foreign investors and exporters need to convert currency? The reason lies in a micro-level grassroots factor: their payees abroad lack bank accounts. As long as workers, governments, and suppliers do not have accounts overseas, foreign investors and exporters must convert foreign exchange into domestic currency through banks for wage payments, taxes, supplier payments, and even personal expenses like purchasing homes. This practice did not exist in modern China. Foreign coins circulated directly upon arrival in China, and various foreign silver coins were exchanged on Chinese soil. Nowadays, with the development of payment methods and increased mobility, it's no longer far-fetched to pay with Alipay in a London restaurant, even though this transaction flows between two Alipay accounts and has no direct relation to the UK.

Conversely, if more Chinese individuals hold accounts in the US and use Apple Pay connected to US accounts, foreign investors would not need to convert currency; they could directly pay salaries in US dollars. Here, US dollars are not domestic US dollar deposits but actual US dollars (US dollar deposits in the US). This discussion unexpectedly touches on deep-seated currency theory, stemming from the earlier profound questions in banking theory. It might be noticed that the only remaining advocate for the use of the Chinese yuan would be the Ministry of Finance, requiring tax payments in Chinese yuan.

However, before such a day arrives, other countries might be concerned, as China possesses the world's most advanced mobile payment technology and practical experience. If China can export its mobile payment capabilities globally, allowing people around the world to open bank accounts in Chinese banks through facial recognition, enabling them to directly use Alipay or WeChat balances, and facilitating financing through funds like Yu'ebao, many central banks and banks in various countries might become obsolete.