原创 2015-10-10 季天鹤央行观察央行观察

作者：季天鹤，方正中期研究院研究员，央行观察专栏作家

"811”汇改过去2个月了。和广泛预计的“跌到7”不同，人民币从6.45的低位上涨至6.35的水平，在岸减离岸的价差已经由负千点转正。对于人民币汇率的走势，观点多有分歧：一种认为人民币不存在长期贬值的基础，原因是经常项目的顺差。另一种认为人民币必将贬值，原因是经济运行的下行。如果仅从理论上观看，似乎两种都有道理。

事实上，人民币汇率是一段时间内市场主体买卖的结果。看空而不做空，是不能让人民币实实在在地贬值的。市场主体将人民币兑换成美元时，对人民币造成贬值压力，但兑换之后，虽然这些外币持有者被称作人民币的空头，即在人民币贬值当中获利，但仅仅持有美元本身并不能影响汇率，必须有其他人继续卖出人民币，才能使人民币贬值。所以，无论经济形势如何，都要落实在买卖上，才能影响汇率。

例如经常项目顺差，很多人自动把顺差理解为境内主体增持了外币，并且想当然地认为境内主体会卖掉外币买入人民币，从而在购买中使人民币升值。但任何做企业的人都知道，卖了多少货不等于收了多少钱，而完全可以是增加了应收帐款，甚至形成坏账收不到钱。同样，经常账户的顺差，只代表货物、服务等等出大于入，并不必然代表了收到了同样多的外币。

例如，出口商出口大于进口商进口，自动会产生经常账户下的贸易顺差，但出口商出口可能导致了对外贸易信贷的增加，而并未收入货款。另外，如果出口商得到了外币，但不用于购买本币，只是以外币存款形式持有，则这部分外币既不会推动人民币升值，也不能被央行用于稳定汇率。人民币国际化增加了问题的复杂性：同样的贸易顺差，如果都是人民币支付，则过程中也并无外币或购买人民币的操作。

而经济形势不好，是否会自动意味着人民币要贬值呢？我们都知道日本经济不好了很多年，但日元则时涨时落，已经说明两者的关系并不简单直接。不好的经济形势想要体现在汇率上，也需要有很多人卖出人民币。可能性当然也很多，比如国外资产收益率高于国内资产收益率，比如国外资产比国内资产安全等等，但都需要真的卖出人民币，才能让人民币贬值。

但目前来看，中国经济形势虽然不好，但利率水平还是高于美国的。此外，尽管国外市场可能有种种好处，但对于不懂国外市场的大量市场主体而言，他们反而会觉得还是国内市场较为熟悉，主观感受上风险更少。加之操作方面，大多数人并没有海外账户，汇款和购汇也都有上限要求，特别大规模的恐慌性购汇和汇出情绪并不存在。而且，由于中国的外债规模较小，因此并不广泛存在不顾一切购汇只为偿债的强制，减少了做空人民币的动量。

人民币会不会长期贬值这一问题，其实并没有很强的方向性答案，原因在于国外投机者和国内130万亿人民币存款的持有者，在这一问题上尽管有一定程度的共识，但由于种种原因，毕竟没有很大规模的具体行动，特别是后者。而由于人行持有3.5万亿美元（超过20万亿元人民币）的外汇储备，因此人行的操作就能够左右市场。

具体而言，人行的人民币战局有两个剧情，都很明确。首先，它在6.35的水平上不可能接住130万亿人民币的卖盘，人行必输无疑，连10都保不住。其次，如果只是境外投机者兴风作浪，由于离岸人民币最多也就3万亿左右，不太可能超过5万亿元，远小于人行的资金量。因此人行只需要一方面截住人民币外流，另一方面把离岸人民币在6.35水平照单全收，做空人民币的游戏结束，人民币胜。

认为人民币跌到7的观点的合理之处，在于看到了基本面上的不利因素，但忽略了汇率是交易的结果，外汇也是一个市场。人行如果通过交易而不是行政命令的方式参与市场，则人行也是市场的一部分，正如股市中也有大户和小散一样，大户可能吃掉小散，但小散也可能套牢大户。所以认为人民币跌到7的观点，如果不是错估了人行的能力，也是低估了人行稳定汇率的决心。当然，人行的决心到底如何，外人也很难知道，所以跌到7的观点尽管没有兑现，但也绝非谬论。

而简单认为人民币有经常项目顺差撑着就不会跌的观点，只能说是侥幸正确，因为如果央行想要更进一步释放贬值压力，人民币确实会跌到7。进出口商才不会把顺差换来的外汇（如果有且等量的话）傻傻地用来换人民币。相反，他们的最优策略乃是持有外汇，坐看人民币贬值。等人民币跌成7了再结汇，岂不收益更多？当然，从长期来看，经常项目的顺差，确实有利于人民币的坚挺，但有利不是保证，长期不是短期。

人行战术上的难点，一方面，它不想把离岸人民币全部吸走，更不想回到1994年，毕竟它还追求人民币国际化和金融市场国际化的目标。但另一方面，它又担心离岸市场的风浪以及各种恐慌性宣传吓坏130万亿人民币存款的持有者，这些满仓人民币的市场主体都是潜在的做空者。所以，人行处在一种不能输，但还不能真把对手干掉的纠结局面。

更为难办的在战略上，人行不光是在带着脚镣跳舞，而且还在追求“逆中求胜”。国际收支上，服务贸易逆差在加剧，对外投资不断增长，居民减持人民币增持国外外币资产越发普遍。各界利益上，过剩产能企业、大宗商品厂商、出口企业等都期待一场通胀和贬值。上述种种现实，以及对利率汇率的期待，都不利于人行维持稳定的汇率。

那么人行为什么不顺势而为？按照人民币升值让人行亏掉万亿的观点，人民币贬值能让人行大赚特赚，绝对是人民币贬值的最大受益者。显然这种观点是十分荒谬的。人行目前的做法，应该说和2013年“钱荒”的情景一样，即逼迫市场主体真正提高自身的生产水平、生产效率和风险控制。央行的直接对手是投机者，但真正的对手乃是依赖人民币汇率低估的市场主体。

海外代购和境外旅游正在倒逼国内的生产与服务业，国内股市的上市公司要和道指的成份股比拼盈利和公司治理，出口企业不能简单靠本币贬值来逃避产业升级，生产企业闷头生产、各自为战、恶性竞争、却总有人接盘的时代已经过去。这次贬值中，形势已经非常清楚：贬值带来的不是出口商的利润增加，而是客户进一步的压价。这不是汇率的问题，这是产品竞争力的问题。

从汇改的历史看，2015年如同2005年的镜像，后者使汇率低估并升值的同时物价也不断升高，前者则使汇率高估并稳定的同时物价降低。但两个时期的目标并不相同，后者通过通胀消化掉体制改革成本，而前者则促使改革走向深水区。央行在用汇率告诉市场主体：认真改革，认真转型。竞争力来自高效率，而不是贬值的货币，靠贬值才能存活的产业，没有未来。

It has been two months since the "811" exchange rate reform. In contrast to the widely expected scenario of the yuan falling to 7, the Chinese yuan has risen from its low of 6.45 to a level of 6.35, and the onshore-offshore price spread has turned positive after being negative by thousands of basis points. There are differing opinions on the trend of the yuan exchange rate: some believe that there is no basis for long-term depreciation of the yuan due to the surplus in the current account, while others believe that the yuan is destined to depreciate due to the downward trend of the economy. From a theoretical perspective, both views seem reasonable.

In reality, the yuan exchange rate is the result of transactions among market participants over a certain period. Holding a bearish view without taking bearish actions cannot actually lead to genuine depreciation of the yuan. When market participants exchange yuan for US dollars, it exerts depreciation pressure on the yuan. However, after the exchange, even though these foreign currency holders are referred to as yuan bears, meaning they profit from the depreciation of the yuan, simply holding US dollars itself cannot influence the exchange rate. It requires others to continue selling yuan to actually lead to yuan depreciation. Thus, regardless of the economic situation, impact on the exchange rate relies on actual transactions.

For instance, in the case of a current account surplus, many automatically assume that the surplus implies domestic entities acquiring more foreign currency and naively think that these entities will automatically sell the foreign currency to buy yuan, thereby appreciating the yuan through their purchases. However, anyone involved in business knows that selling goods does not equate to receiving payment, and it could simply result in increased accounts receivable, or even result in bad debts. Similarly, a current account surplus only signifies that goods, services, etc., exported exceed those imported; it does not necessarily mean that an equivalent amount of foreign currency has been received.

For example, an exporter with a surplus over an importer's deficit generates a trade surplus in the current account. However, the exporter's exports might lead to an increase in foreign trade credit, without necessarily receiving payment. Furthermore, if the exporter receives foreign currency but does not use it to buy local currency and instead holds it as foreign currency deposits, this portion of foreign currency will neither drive yuan appreciation nor be utilized by the central bank to stabilize the exchange rate. The internationalization of the yuan adds complexity to the issue: for the same trade surplus, if both transactions are conducted in yuan, there is no operation involving foreign currency or purchasing yuan.

And when the economic situation is unfavorable, does it automatically imply that the yuan must depreciate? We know that Japan's economy has not been doing well for many years, yet the yen's value fluctuates; this demonstrates that the relationship between the economy and the exchange rate is not straightforward. To reflect poorly on the economy through the exchange rate also requires a substantial number of people to sell yuan. The possibilities are numerous, such as foreign assets yielding higher returns than domestic assets, or foreign assets being considered safer than domestic ones. However, these actions need to involve actual sales of yuan to cause depreciation.

Currently, China's economic situation is unfavorable, but its interest rates are still higher than those of the United States. Additionally, despite various advantages that foreign markets may offer, for many market participants who are unfamiliar with foreign markets, the domestic market might be seen as more familiar and less risky subjectively. Furthermore, operationally, most people do not have overseas accounts, and there are limits on remittances and foreign exchange purchases. There is no massive panic-driven purchase of foreign exchange or capital outflow. Additionally, due to China's relatively small external debt scale, there is not widespread compulsive buying of foreign exchange just to meet debt obligations, reducing momentum for shorting the yuan.

The question of whether the yuan will depreciate in the long term does not actually have a strongly directional answer. This is because foreign speculators and holders of the 13 trillion yuan in deposits inside China have some degree of consensus on this issue, but due to various reasons, they are ultimately not taking large-scale specific actions, especially the latter. Additionally, due to China's foreign exchange reserves of 3.5 trillion US dollars (over 20 trillion yuan), the central bank's actions can significantly influence the market.

Specifically, the People's Bank of China (PBOC) has two clear tactical scenarios. First, at the level of 6.35, it cannot possibly absorb the 13 trillion yuan in sell orders. The PBOC is undoubtedly destined to lose, and it cannot even defend the level of 6.10. Secondly, if only foreign speculators are creating turmoil, since offshore yuan is at most around 3 trillion, it is unlikely to exceed 5 trillion yuan, which is much smaller than the PBOC's funds. Thus, the PBOC only needs to intercept the outflow of yuan on one hand, and on the other hand, fully receive the offshore yuan at the level of 6.35, ending the short-selling game of the yuan. The yuan will win.

The rationale behind the viewpoint that the yuan will fall to 7 lies in recognizing adverse factors in the fundamentals but neglecting that the exchange rate is a result of transactions, and foreign exchange is a market. If the PBOC participates in the market through transactions rather than administrative orders, then the PBOC is also part of the market. Just as the stock market includes both major players and retail investors, large players may consume retail investors, but retail investors may also trap large players. Thus, the viewpoint that the yuan will fall to 7, if it is not underestimating the PBOC's capabilities, is underestimating the PBOC's determination to stabilize the exchange rate. Of course, it is difficult for outsiders to know the extent of the PBOC's determination, so while the viewpoint that the yuan will fall to 7 has not been confirmed, it is also not a fallacy.

The viewpoint that the yuan's surplus in the current account can sustain it from falling only has an element of luck in being correct, because if the central bank intends to further release depreciation pressure, the yuan will indeed fall to 7. Exporters will not naively use the foreign exchange gained from a surplus (if any and in equivalent amounts) to exchange for yuan. On the contrary, their optimal strategy is to hold foreign exchange and watch the yuan depreciate. Waiting until the yuan has fallen to 7 before exchanging, wouldn't that yield more profits? Of course, in the long term, a surplus in the current account is indeed beneficial for the yuan's stability, but being advantageous does not guarantee it, and the long term is not the short term.

The strategic difficulty for the PBOC lies in the fact that it is not just dancing with shackles on, but is also pursuing a strategy of "winning through reverse means." In terms of international receipts and payments, the deficit in services trade is intensifying, outbound investment is continually growing, and residents are increasingly reducing holdings of yuan and increasing holdings of foreign currency assets. In terms of various vested interests, excess capacity enterprises, bulk commodity manufacturers, and export enterprises all anticipate inflation and depreciation. In light of these various realities, as well as expectations for interest rates and exchange rates, it is unfavorable for the PBOC to maintain a stable exchange rate.

So why doesn't the PBOC go with the flow? According to the view that yuan appreciation would cause the PBOC to lose trillions, yuan depreciation would enable the PBOC to profit handsomely. Clearly, this view is absurd. The PBOC's current approach is somewhat reminiscent of the "money crunch" of 2013, forcing market participants to genuinely raise their own production levels, production efficiency, and risk control. The central bank's direct opponent is speculators, but its true opponent is market participants who rely on an undervalued yuan. Overseas shopping and overseas tourism are forcing domestic production and service industries; listed companies in the domestic stock market have to compete with Dow Jones Industrial Average components in terms of profitability and corporate governance. Export enterprises cannot merely rely on currency depreciation to avoid industrial upgrading. The era of production enterprises working in isolation, competing viciously, and being taken over by others is already past. The current depreciation has made the situation very clear: depreciation does not increase profits for exporters but instead leads customers to further demand price reductions. This is not a currency exchange issue; it is a problem of product competitiveness.

Looking at the history of exchange rate reforms, 2015 mirrors 2005. The latter period led to an undervalued and appreciating exchange rate, while prices continued to rise. The former period resulted in an overvalued and stable exchange rate, and prices decreased. However, the goals of the two periods were different. The latter period used inflation to absorb the costs of institutional reform, while the former period compelled reforms to advance into deeper waters. The central bank is telling market participants through the exchange rate: reform seriously, transform earnestly. Competitiveness comes from efficiency, not a depreciating currency. Industries that can only survive through depreciation have no future.